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ASSESSING ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AND COSTS OF  





Dennis Kaputo Chiwele  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) has taken the decision 
to rollout in 2009 a national social cash transfer scheme (SCTS) to cover the whole country by 
2012. Thus far, social cash transfer schemes are being piloted in five districts in Southern and 
Eastern Provinces. The schemes are using structures created for the implementation of the 
Public Welfare Assistance System (PWAS) which rise from community level all the way to the 
national level.  
The adoption of pilot SCTS in Zambia follows the growing acceptance of social cash 
transfers as a means for assisting extremely poor households. Partly, this is due to the positive 
impact of conditional cash transfers in Latin America with respect to school enrolments, 
improved health and reduction in poverty levels for participating households. An evaluation  
of the Kalomo SCTS revealed a number of achievements with respect to impact on the 
beneficiaries including a rise in self-esteem and confidence among beneficiaries, reduced 
incidence of begging, increased food consumption, increased asset ownership and positive 
impacts for the local economy. Field work for this assessment although not focused on 
assessing impacts noted qualitative evidence of these findings.    
Implementation of pilot schemes started in 2004 with the Kalomo SCTS followed by one in 
2005 in Kazungula, 2006 in Chipata and in 2007 in Monze and Katete. The schemes have been 
implemented with some variation so that they “generate information on the feasibility, costs 
and benefits and negative impacts of a Social Cash Transfer Scheme…” (Zulu and Schuring, 
May 2007, p.1). Each of the pilot scheme has been designed to form a part of the learning 
agenda that would utilise lessons towards the design of a national social cash transfer. It is also 
being assessed as to the extent to which the PWAS structures are able to accommodate social 
cash transfer along existing social welfare activities. 
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This assessment tackles an important question of whether the MCDSS and PWAS 
structures have the capacity to implement a national SCTS. It looks at three main aspects of 
capacity: (i) administrative capacity covering institutional, organisational and human resource 
capacity; (ii) physical assets and infrastructure; and, (iii) Cash transfer costs and financing. 
Information for the assessment was obtained through a review of various documents, focus 
group discussions held at all levels (national, provincial, district and sub-district level) and 
personal interviews of key informants. Field visits were undertaken to all the five districts with 
pilot and two districts in North Western Province without SCTS – Kasempa and Mufumbwe.  
KEY FINDINGS 
THE SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER PROCESS 
The five social cash transfer schemes are using with some variation the targeting, approval and 
payment process which was developed for the Kalomo SCTS. The efficacy of the outreach and 
targeting process is mainly driven by the Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs). 
They apply a means testing criteria that require them to identify and select the poorest 10 per 
cent households in the community.  
However, this is faced with some challenges. The low literacy levels at community level 
have led to some difficulties in the application of the means testing criteria. The Katete SCTS 
which is a universal scheme had the least complicated means testing criteria which appeared 
to match existing capacities at district and sub-district levels. The voice mechanism that has 
been carefully worked in the process has not functioned as well as expected because of the 
culture of silence. Cases of nepotism and corruption have also been present, especially in the 
case of the Chipata SCTS which is an urban scheme. But there are also numerous complaints 
because the 10 per cent households selected beneficiaries are largely indistinguishable from 
many others not selected given the high levels of extreme poverty in communities. 
The approval process is designed to scrutinise applications so that inclusion error is kept 
to the minimum. It requires a good capacity for information management. The extent to which 
it works is dependent on the functionality of the District Welfare Assistance Committee as it is 
responsible for approving recommended beneficiaries. In many districts visited, the DWAC met 
regularly although some districts with poor administrative coordination among government 
departments had a challenge in this regard. 
The payment process has been reformed to answer the difficulties experienced in 
beneficiaries getting the transfers. Therefore, localised pay point system was adopted after 
congestion at banks by beneficiaries, majority of whom could not read or write made bank 
official to despair and threatened their own efficacy in handling general client matters. It also 
helped to reduce distances for beneficiaries as pay point managers now collected cash from 
the bank and made payments within the communities. And yet other payment difficulties have 
emerged with serious delays in transfers being experienced starting in October 2007 pointing 
to general problems in financial management at national level. 
The targeting, approval and payment process of a social cash transfer scheme brings 
about capacity demands that should be looked into before rollout begins. Two are critically 
important. First is the need to adopt a much simpler means testing criteria to match the  
level of literacy and skills available at community level. In the Katete SCTS beneficiaries are 
individuals over the age of 60 years old. Field observations indicated that there were fewer 
problems with this approach as the selection criteria was simple and well understood by all.                 Country Study  3 
 
It was nevertheless feared by some that this excluded those below 60 years who were 
incapacitated as well. Those who favoured this system suggested that the old accounted for  
a higher proportion of the poor while they were increasingly taking up the responsibility of 
looking after the orphans and other vulnerable children. The second is the need to upgrade 
the skills of the ACC members so that they can provide intensive and better supervision and 
monitoring to CWACs. 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
The MCDSS faces challenges to provide leadership on social protection to other players 
because of the weak space it occupies in Zambia’s institutional architecture. The situation has 
improved in recent times helped by the establishment of a Sector Advisory Group on Social 
Protection (SP-SAG). As a result, the Fifth National Development Plan included a separate 
chapter on social protection.  This was based on the Social Protection Strategy adopted in 
2005. Nevertheless, it has been observed that there has not been sufficient wider buy-in such 
that even the Ministry of Finance to which the SP-SAG reported does not seem fully persuaded 
about the contents and recommendations of the social protection chapter in the FNDP. 
Inadequate support to social protection by the political elites seems to be the underlying 
problem as there is no one to take Government to account concerning its responsibility to 
protect the extremely disadvantaged persons and households. In the past, there have also 
been questions of ownership within the MCDSS as donors at times dominated debate and 
pushed for initiatives on social protection in general and social cash transfers. It is nevertheless 
suggested that there has been improvement in this regard as MCDSS staff are now enthusiastic 
about the SCTS and are pushing as much for its scaling up. 
The PWAS structure is elaborate. It is driven by committees of volunteers at various levels 
– community, ward and district levels. At all levels of Zambia’s governance hierarchy, there are 
corresponding committees into which PWAS committees feed. This elaborate and inclusive 
coordination structure provides ample opportunities for the MCDSS to sell and allow other 
agencies to buy into its agenda. Unfortunately this potential is not fully utilised. Coordination  
is weakest at national level because of the weak state of the limited influence that MCDSS has 
over other key ministries. Lack of operational resources at district level has eroded the 
coordination capacity of the District Social Welfare Offices (DSWOs).   
The stalling of decentralisation means that line ministries’ district structures continue to 
be more vertically linked with their HQs than with other organisations in the district reducing 
the extent to which effective collaboration can take place.  
An example is the multiplicity of committees that exist at sub-district level because  
each line ministry with activities at community level want its own committee established.  
Sub-district coordination is also affected by the fact that coordinating bodies, the Area 
Development Committee at ward level and the Village Development Committee at community 
level are new and have not been well established in some areas. They are also constrained  
by lack of resources.  
Institutional constraints that the MCDSS faces are mostly beyond its capacity to resolve. 
However, it should take steps to lobby and political buy-in of the social protection agenda.  
A well researched case on the economic merits of social protection need to be undertaken  
and sold to the Ministry of Finance and the general public. But in general, there is need to  
fully implement the communication strategy recently developed by MCDSS.  4       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
Part of the difficulties that MCDSS faces in providing leadership on social protection emanate 
from its own internal weaknesses. This is partly due to human resource constraints as discussed 
below. It is also due to the chronic under-funding of social protection that has reduced its 
functionality, also more fully discussed below. With regard to funding, amounts disbursed to 
districts for PWAS activities are so low that DSWOs rotate among ACCs the needed assistance 
to help the assistance not to be thinly spread out. But the amounts given to each individual is 
still very small. 
Further weakening organisational capacity is the weak state of physical assets and 
infrastructure in districts and provinces to a certain extent. Most DSWO have inadequate 
accommodation such that increasing the number of staff will be a serious challenge. There are 
a number of districts without well functioning computers while internet connectivity is in only 
a few districts. The state of furniture and fittings is de-motivating members of staff. Therefore, 
the image of the MCDSS is not as favourable as is needed for a ministry that is supposed to 
champion and coordinate the critical agenda of social protection. 
Therefore, there is a vicious cycle. Even if an elaborate structure for coordination  
and consultation exists from national to community level, an under-funded MCDSS is 
organisationally weak to implement social protection activities and effectively mobilise and 
coordinate other players who must play a role. Better funding of the MCDSS as recommended 
below would go a long way in resolving its organisational weaknesses. Before rolling a social 
cash transfer to a district, it is important that it should have adequate physical assets and 
infrastructure. The MCDSS should also review and improve the M&E system to ensure that 
there is adequate and good quality information for strategic decisions. 
HUMAN CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
The assessment finds that the Department of Social Welfare is understaffed. Except for Lusaka, 
the rest of the provinces do not have the full manpower establishment, especially in remote 
areas. Before the SCTS could be introduced in a district, there is need to recruit more staff if the 
implementation of the scheme is not to be negatively affected. Many people reported to feel 
that the demands (in terms of human resources) for social cash transfer schemes are high and 
their design underestimated this. As a result of the high demand, other services provided by 
the DSW were suffering in the district as attention turned to the implementation of the SCTS.1 
DSW staff in non-pilot districts are also faced with the challenge of keeping their 
motivation high due to a number of reasons. They are embarrassed that they have to always 
seek help from other departments for things such as transport and computers. Further, the 
inability of PWAS to pay allowances to the officers operating it as is the case with the other GRZ 
activities has huge implications for their motivations. Therefore, MCDSS staff constantly gets 
attracted to non-PWAS related activities in the district or elsewhere to compensate for this.  
A huge advantage of the PWAS structure is its cadre of volunteers at sub-district level in 
CWACs and ACCs. It also relies on partnerships with other organisations at district level from 
which it draws representatives sitting on the DWAC. Volunteers and partners help PWAS to 
implement welfare assistance cost effectively and apply its targeting, approval and payment 
process in a transparent and participatory manner. Many members have shown commendable 
commitment. But there are challenges as well including the question of incentives. For CWAC                Country Study  5 
 
and ACC members, this is an issue particularly because other government supported 
programmes give something to members of their community based committees. Therefore, 
PWAS activities are negatively affected whenever they coincided with those of other line 
ministries where some payment was made. This is worsened by the fact that community  
based committees are to a large degree being run by the same people who move from  
one committee to the other. They feel pressure for the time they spend on these activities 
which compete with their own livelihood activities. There are questions on how long these 
volunteers could go on without some form of incentive. Limited resources to carry out their 
work properly, including the low and irregular amounts of transfers demotivate committees.      
The findings above suggest that the recruitment of staff to fill all the vacancies be 
completed as a matter of urgency. The MCDSS should also adopt a human resource 
development plan which continuously upgrades the skills of its staff. Lastly, an incentive 
system for the PWAS cadre of volunteers should be found. 
THE COST AND FINANCING OF CASH TRANSFERS 
Government funding of social protection in the past has been low and erratic. Between 1994 
and 2006, it was less than 1 per cent of the GRZ total expenditure in most years. This is at the 
heart of the many problems that the PWAS faces and which a national social cash transfer 
scheme would face. Although in some years the GRZ has budgeted for what could reasonably 
support social protection activities, releases have been poor, as low as 10 to 12 per cent of  
the budget amount in some years. However, the GRZ has signalled intention to increase 
substantially funding for social protection in the coming years according to the Green paper 
released in November 2007 to range between 1.6 and 3.8 per cent of the total budget.  
Based on the Kalomo SCTS experience, the cost of rolling out the SCTS is estimated to rise 
from US$9.3 million in the first year of rollout when fifteen districts are covered to US$44.4 
million when the entire country is covered. This is a huge amount and there is justifiable concern 
whether the GRZ can sustain this without donor support. If the Ministry of Finance decides to 
hold the allocation for social protection constant at 2010 level, a national social cash transfer 
would constitute 70 per cent of the total social protection budget. But this is partly because the 
MTEF projects a decline of funding to social protection from K489.8 billion in 2008 to K245.5 
billion in 2010. Keeping the budget for social protection constant at the 2008 level would mean 
that the national SCTS would constitute about 34.8 per cent when it has reached its full scale. 
This is still a huge proportion and would require a major restructuring in the social 
protection budget. Given that regularly disbursed social cash transfers would resolve so many 
problems among the incapacitated households, the opportunity of restructuring the social 
protection budget exists. However, it also requires that more funding is allocated to social 
protection by the Ministry of Finance. A window of opportunity lies in the expected windfall 
tax on mineral earnings, some of which could be allocated to social protection. The difficulty to 
anticipate this happening lies in how social protection thus far has attracted such little political 
support and how the Ministry of Finance remains unconvinced regarding its economic merits. 
Actions to enhance the standing of the MCDSS within the institutional framework of 
Zambia’s governance system would help to lobby for social protection and put it on the 
national agenda to the extent that it could attract better funding.          6       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION  
1.1  BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES  
This report presents findings of an assessment of the administrative capacity and costs of  
cash transfer schemes in Zambia and their implications for the rollout. The background to  
the assessment is that in November 2006, the Ministry of Community Development and Social 
Services (MCDSS) adopted an Implementation Framework for Scaling Up a National System  
on Cash Transfer. The resulting framework document outlined a rollout road map of a national 
social cash transfer to take place over a four-year period from 2009 to 2012.2 But before scale-up 
could start, the MCDSS needed by the end of 2008 to develop “a nationally agreed 
implementation plan and mechanisms for a national social assistance programme”  
(MCDSS, November 2006, p.4).  
Such a plan was to be based on the experience obtained from five pilot social cash 
transfer schemes in Kalomo, Monze, Kazungula, Chipata and Katete. The pilot schemes are 
testing different modalities of social cash transfer as part of a learning agenda that would lead 
to a unified model. All the schemes are utilising the social protection delivery structure created 
for the Public Welfare Assistance System (PWAS) described in Chapter 2. The expanded social 
cash transfer is expected to utilise the PWAS system as well. A key question has been whether 
the MCDSS in general and the PWAS structures in particular have adequate capacity to sustain 
such an expanded social cash transfer system.  
The assessment of the experience of the pilot five schemes needed to answer the 
following four main questions: 
•  What targeting system would have the maximum merit for including the most 
deserving beneficiaries?  
•  Will such a system have significant positive and sustainable outcomes? 
•  Is there adequate capacity to administer such a system in all districts of Zambia at 
all levels – national, provincial, district and community levels - and how could this 
be built where there are deficiencies?  
•  Is it fiscally feasible to sustain such a system in terms of cost and available funds?   
 
The assessment carried out for this report addresses the last two questions,  
i.e. administrative capacity and fiscal feasibility, although the first two are kept in the 
background throughout as they inform the questions addressed more directly. For example, 
the nature of the targeting system adopted would benefit or be constrained by the available 
capacity to implement it. Specifically the objectives of the assessment were to: 
•  Assess the administrative requirements of PWAS and of cash transfer schemes as a 
part of PWAS, in order to draw conclusions about the implications of expanded 
service provision;  
•  Provide an overview of physical assets and infrastructure in sample districts;                Country Study  7 
 
•  Analyse the direct and indirect costs of providing regular cash transfers to 
incapacitated groups, and the implication on the national budget of 
implementing such a scheme nationally; 
•  Consider the differentiation of the implications for expanded programming in 
rural and urban areas; and, 
•  Recommend rollout criteria in terms of institutional preparedness. 
 
1.2  SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF THE ASSESSMENT 
Following the objectives above, the assessment tackled three areas with great bearing on an 
organisation’s capacity to design and deliver services in a sustainable way: (i) administrative 
capacity; (ii) physical assets and infrastructure; and, (iii) cash transfer costs and financing.  
1.3  DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH 
Three main approaches were utilised to gather information for capacity assessment. The first 
was a literature review of documents pertaining to PWAS, social cash transfer schemes in the 
five districts and policy documents on social protection such as the National Social Protection 
Strategy and the relevant sections of the Fifth National Development Plan. Evaluations, reviews 
and special studies were also reviewed. Literature on the theory and practice of social 
protection in general and social cash transfers in particular were also reviewed to provide  
the needed international perspective.  
The second were Focus Group Discussions at each level of assessment, i.e. at national, 
provincial, district and community levels. FGDs consisted of carefully selected groups of people 
who had experience and insight in the functioning of the PWAS structure and social cash 
transfers. At national level, the FGD included Department of Social Welfare Staff (DSW) at the 
Headquarters who were joined by Provincial Social Welfare Officers (PSWOs) from Southern and 
Eastern Provinces. This FGD provided insight on link to national policies, funding mechanisms 
and institutional coordination arrangements. At provincial level, the FGD were with staff in the 
PSWO office. There were two types of FGD at the district level, i.e. with the staff in the District 
Social Welfare Office (DSWO) and with members of the District Welfare Assistance Committee 
(DWAC). At sub-national level, FGDs were held with members of Area Coordinating Committees 
(ACCs) and Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs), Pay Point Managers, and 
beneficiaries in selected areas. The third approach was the use of personal interviews with people 
perceived to have good insight in the issues of focus. This relied on the use of a pre-agreed 
checklist of issues.  Both of FGDs and personal interviews triangulated the information  
gathered through literature and document review as well as fill in gaps. 
The methods were supported by the participation of three Provincial Social Welfare 
Officers as investigators in the assessment. They were part of the team in the gathering of 
information. But because they were already familiar with the operations of the DSW, PWAS  
and STCS, they were used in the team to check and verify different aspects raised by the 
respondents. This was particularly important for this study because it is difficult to understand 
by mere interviews the efficacy of administrative systems in place unless one continually 
bounced off observations on those who understand the system from inside. Their participation 
also speeded up information gathering at all levels owing to their familiarity with the system as 
well as existing information sources. 8       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
1.4  CHALLENGES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ASSESSMENT 
Not withstanding the help of PSWOs, understanding and analysing capacity issues is difficult 
given the broad range and interplay of issues contributing to and undermining capacity.  
As such, gaps in the assessment are inevitable. The study tried to minimise this in two main 
ways. Firstly, it sought to isolate key aspects of capacity and focus on these without tracking 
each peripheral issue. Although this is a strength, it also meant certain important issues are not 
looked into because they were judged from the beginning as not being important. Therefore, 
although it was necessary and useful to develop a detailed checklist of issues, its weakness in 
this regard must be recognised. Second, issues were triangulated from many view points  
of different stakeholders. But this also meant that the amount of information obtained 
accumulated and became voluminous for ease of analysis and raised the probability of  
certain issues dropping out of the radar. 
CHAPTER 2: A CASE FOR SOCIAL CASH TRANSFERS 
2.1  SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER SCHEMES, THEORY AND PRACTICE  
In recent years social protection has moved up on the development agenda. This is in part due 
to the stubbornness of chronic poverty and the failure of many interventions to rectify it. 
Where social protection was looked down upon suspiciously as expensive and detrimental  
to development, there is now growing consensus regarding the necessity for measures that 
enhance the wellbeing of segments of the population that lack the capacity to protect 
themselves from dilapidating long term trends, shocks or seasonality factors. The range of  
such social protection measures has been grouped under four categories (Stephen Devereux,  
June 2006, p.1). The first are protective interventions aimed at saving lives and offer relief  
from deprivation. The second are preventive interventions aimed at averting deprivation for  
the identified segments of the population. The third category is promotive interventions  
aimed at enhancing incomes and capabilities of vulnerable groups. Lastly are transformative 
interventions which “aim to address issues of social equity and exclusion, and to reduce 
vulnerability by transforming the socio-legal context within which livelihoods are constructed”. 
Social cash transfer schemes are included among two of the above categories, protective 
and promotive interventions. In the former case are unconditional cash transfers used in 
emergency cases to provide relief from the devastation of natural or human induced disasters. 
In addition to this, unconditional cash transfers are also being used in situations where 
people’s capabilities are so devastated they cannot avoid falling into destitution without 
external assistance. Many conditional cash transfers take a promotive approach as they require 
beneficiaries to fulfil specific pre-set conditions. Paramount in unconditional cash transfers is 
the protective element aiming at ensuring that recipients do not fall further into destitution. 
Nevertheless, they too have promotive objectives such as aiming for better nutritional 
outcome of beneficiary households even if it is not required to fulfil prescribed conditions.  
2.2  BACKGROUND TO PILOT SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER SCHEMES IN ZAMBIA 
Justification for the need to pay greater attention to social protection in general and social 
cash transfers in particular is based on the rising number of incapacitated households in 
Zambia, due to the following:                Country Study  9 
 
•  The high incidence of poverty with 64 per cent living in poverty in 2006 (80 per 
cent in rural areas and 34 per cent in urban areas). Extreme poverty was put at  
51 per cent for Zambia as a whole, 67 per cent for rural areas and 20 per cent for 
urban areas. It means that more than half of Zambians, particularly rural areas,  
did not have enough food to meet their daily energy requirements. 
•  The high prevalence of HIV&AIDS which in 2002 was almost 16 per cent.  
•  Increasing joblessness in urban areas as the economy for many years  
remained stagnant.  
•  Recurrence of droughts in the last two decades 
 
All these factors have worked together and led to general livelihoods failure as the  
asset base (financial, human, physical, natural and social) of households has deteriorated 
considerably. Given such a worsening vulnerability context, there are many households that 
annot lift themselves out of destitution and thus need support to do so.  
For a country with a not well developed social protection system, kinship relationships are 
the only safety nets that families in adversity fall back on. But poverty and AIDS are producing 
strains in the extended family system as the burden of care surpasses its capacity which shuts 
out the only avenue available to such households to recover from destitution. For a good 
proportion of the population with few assets left to face these negative impacts, external 
assistance seems the only hope to avoid falling into and climbing out of complete destitution.  
For this reason, the Zambian Government and donors have tried various interventions.  
An assessment study for social protection schemes which included twelve case studies 
revealed the broad range of mechanisms for social protection being applied in Zambia 
(RuralNet Associates Limited, 2005). Stephen Devereux (June 2006), in the comparative  
study of Southern Africa social protection schemes referred to above listed eighteen  
schemes in Zambia which operated between 2000 and 2005 with varying objectives, coverage 
and instruments. They catered for different vulnerabilities grouped under three categories: 
prevention, mitigation and coping risk management.  Many of the schemes are not national  
in character and tend to be geographically targeted either because they are project funded 
catering for selected communities or the nature of vulnerability is geographical in nature.  
Pilot social cash transfer schemes should thus be seen as a quest for Zambia to find an 
effective intervention mechanism in terms of impact on the beneficiaries and the capacity of 
existing systems to design and implement them. The Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme was 
the first of the five pilot schemes and started in 2004 with coverage of two agricultural blocks 
of the district. A decision was reached in 2006 to expand the scheme to the whole district.  
This was attained in January 2008. In 2005, a pilot scheme was started in Kazungula and 
February 2006 in Chipata while Monze and Katete had their schemes initiated in 2007.  
The aim has been to reduce starvation and extreme poverty in the 10 per cent most  
destitute and incapacitated (non-viable) households in each pilot area (Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services and German Technical Cooperation, September, 2007, p.3).   10       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
2.3  THE SCTS LEARNING AGENDA 
It is perhaps wise to consider these as separate schemes because they use different 
implementation modalities even if the general framework is essentially the same. The targeting, 
approval and payment process has been adopted from the Kalomo SCTS. The reason for 
variation in the different pilot schemes is to generate important lessons on the feasibility of the 
different models to be used in the rolling out of social cash transfer scheme to cover the whole 
nation. Before the end of 2008, the Ministry of Community and Social Development through 
the Technical Working Group on Social Assistance was expected to adopt a harmonised  
model to rollout throughout the country in 2009. Therefore, the pilot schemes are being 
implemented as part of the learning agenda that would utilise lessons towards the design  
of a national social cash transfer.  
All the pilot schemes are being implemented through the PWAS structures. Therefore, 
a big lesson being anticipated is the extent to which these structures are robust enough  
to accommodate social cash transfer alongside their existing work, as an additional 
element of assistance.  
The Technical Working Group on Social Assistance (TWG-SA) wants to assess the capacity 
of these structures at local, district, provincial and national level (MCDSS, July 2007, p.4).  
For this, the Kalomo and Monze schemes which are supposed to be rolled out to the entire 
district by 2008 are expected to yield the most lessons even though the experience from  
other pilot schemes will also be relevant. To be observed as well from the two schemes is  
how the process of scaling up from a few areas to cover the entire district ought to be handled. 
Additional lessons anticipated from the Monze scheme will be on the efficacy of soft 
conditionality on health and education for beneficiary households. On education all children in 
the household of school-going age are enrolled in primary school. Those aged up to 10 years 
who may have not been enrolled in school before are asked to start school. The children  
who dropped out of school are also being asked to return to school depending on their age 
(maximum 16) and the grade they completed last. All children in the household of school-going 
age are supposed to complete primary school and should attend at least 80 per cent of each 
term whether enrolled in primary or secondary school. On health, households should have an 
under 5 card for all children under 5 years old and ensure to complete all their vaccinations. 
Households are also supposed to take children to the under-five clinic for growth monitoring.    
Kazungula has no formally adopted learning agenda. However, the original intention was 
to implement a social cash transfer scheme in a remote, hard to reach and sparsely populated 
area. The Chipata pilot SCTS is meant to yield lessons pertaining to how social cash transfers 
could be implemented in an urban setting. The scheme is implemented in three wards of 
Chipata Central, targeting peri-urban areas. Given this, it was envisaged that an innovative 
cash delivery mechanism using smart cards could be experimented upon. Unfortunately this 
has not materialised. The scheme also has some elements of soft conditionality as households 
are given a lump sum every month and then additional cash for every child in primary 
[ZMK10,000] and secondary school [ZMK20,000]. As such the amount received could be more 
substantial compared to what is provided in other pilot schemes. As in Monze, it is intended to 
check whether this stimulates increased school enrolment, retention and better school 
performance among beneficiaries.                 Country Study  11 
 
The Katete pilot SCTS unlike the other four schemes is a universal age-based targeting 
scheme. It is targeted at individuals turning 60 years old rather than households. This was 
based on the understanding that the aged formed the bulk of the incapacitated households. 
Furthermore, it was thought households headed by old people took up greater responsibility 
of looking after orphans and other incapacitated individuals.    
The intention of a learning agenda is clear but the progress in attaining the information 
and analysing it appeared limited.  
2.4  PERSPECTIVES ON IMPACTS 
Whether these pilot schemes would be scaled up to cover the whole country depends on the 
extent to which they are seen to yield positive impacts on the beneficiaries. Unfortunately  
not enough assessment of the impacts has been done mainly because these are not mature 
schemes as the oldest, the Kalomo SCTS, is only three years old. So far, it is only the Kalomo 
scheme where a rigorous evaluation has been done. Other studies have touched on impacts  
as well but not in sufficient detail to be conclusive. This study although not focused on impacts 
also received qualitative information regarding perceptions on benefits accruing to 
participating households. A picture can thus be built from all these sources regarding the  
likely benefits of the social cash transfer schemes. 
But first we summarise the Kalomo SCTS evaluation conducted in 2006. It made the 
following observations (MCDSS, October 2006): 
•  Cash transfers led to a rise in self-esteem and confidence among beneficiaries who 
saw themselves less looked down upon by their neighbours. They were also more 
hopeful regarding the future and had begun to plan for it.  
•  Related to this, the incidence of begging went down from 86.7 per cent to 69.3  
per cent while 75 per cent of those who begged indicated that they begged less.  
•  Although the evaluation was not able to indicate the impact of the cash transfer 
on the local economy, this was likely to be positive given that 81.3 per cent of the 
funds transferred were spent locally. And these funds were delivered consistently 
every month.  
•  Food consumption increased with the proportion of people having one meal a day 
dropping from 19.3 per cent at baseline to 13.3 per cent during the evaluation.  
The proportion who felt hungry after each meal dropped from 56.3 per cent to 
34.8 per cent. There was also improvement in the range of foods consumed which 
obviously led to a more balanced diet. Consequently, the incidence of illness fell 
down from 42.5 per cent to 35 per cent.  
•  Asset ownership among beneficiaries went up despite the amounts being very 
small. Regarding livestock, not much change could be detected for big livestock, 
specifically cattle, for obvious reasons. But the ownership of goats increased  
from 8.5 per cent at baseline to 41.7 per cent at evaluation. Chicken ownership 
increased from 42.4 per cent to 57.6 per cent. Indeed “the number of beneficiary 
households making investments quadrupled from roughly 14% to 50% and the 
average amount invested doubled. 71% of all households mentioned that they 
had invested part of the social cash and 52% of them even started to have 
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The findings cited above refute the fear that poor people receiving income support would 
spend it irresponsibly. Instead they are prudent enough to begin to derive benefits beyond the 
original expectation of mere improved food consumption. This observation has been borne 
out by other studies. The findings on the Kalomo scheme were in line with observations made 
in the external monitoring of the scheme (see GTZ, July, 2005; Schubert, 2004 and Katharina 
Wietlar, January 2007). 
Interviews with key informants in the field appeared to confirm the Kalomo SCTS 
evaluation findings. One district official in Chipata not directly connected to the pilot scheme 
observed: “the money may be very small but it is having positive impacts on the lives of the 
people. Some beneficiaries are skipping payment to let the cash accumulate. Beneficiaries 
have generally proved very responsible”. This was a line repeated in all the five pilot districts 
visited. The seven months delay in the release of funds in 2007, although it caused severe 
administrative difficulties, was said to have been a boon to recipients who used the 
accumulated amounts for capital investments. In all the areas visited, there was a persistent 
suggestion that the schemes should consider providing some larger lump sums once in a 
while to enable the beneficiaries invest in Income Generating Activities. It was also suggested 
that beneficiaries need to be helped to work with others rather than in isolation so that they 
could enhance the chance of lifting themselves out of poverty. However, this was clearly 
outside the scope of the schemes and would require another set of capacities to make it work. 
The freedom of choice that cash was seen to impute on beneficiaries was considered a 
great advantage of the social cash transfer schemes over assistance from the regular PWAS. 
“The regular PWAS tends to limit the level of exploration by the beneficiaries. Therefore, when 
a blanket is given, a beneficiary is usually deemed to have benefited enough and should allow 
chance to others. But usually it transpires that this could not even be the priority need or that 
the beneficiary has a series of other small needs. The beneficiary if given cash could determine 
how best to go about solving these problems” (Community Development Officer, Kasempa).  
In general, therefore, it was said that social cash transfers had been so well received that 
they were helping to enhance the image of the Department of Social Welfare where they 
were being implemented, which hitherto had not been favourable. Many people interviewed 
pointed to the need for consistency in the transfers over a long enough period for benefits 
listed above to materialise as beneficiaries gradually improve their situation. The change  
of retargeting period from one to three years is consistent with this perception. However, 
payments should be timely. Although the delay in transfers in 2007 observed above allowed 
some beneficiaries to make investments they could otherwise not have made, it brought  
a great sense of insecurity in their minds and was a drain on many players who had to 
constantly answer queries and make follow up on the funds. However, some beneficiaries 
borrowed money to tide them up over the period without transfers which they repaid once 
they received the cash. 
On the negative side, it was pointed out that social cash transfers could be eroding social 
cohesion of rural communities. In one focus group discussion held in Kalomo, it was pointed 
out that some community members were no longer volunteering to work in the fields of 
incapacitated households as they used to before but were now asking to be paid instead.   
This is consistent with the observation above that beneficiary households were no longer  
too dependent on the community to meet their needs. But a perception may have began to 
emerge that the transfers received were enough to meet all the recipients needs and they did                Country Study  13 
 
not need help from other community members. It is easy to foresee that as the social cash 
transfer schemes become a permanent feature, the culture of solidarity with the needy in 
society within communities and within the extended family system may begin to wane and  
the response to adversity could increasingly become institutionalised. According to the OVC 
Situational Analysis carried out in 2004, traditional safety nets are becoming weak anyway due 
to the scale of the problem (GRZ, 2004). Therefore, withholding response so that traditional 
safety nets are not interfered with may not achieve the purpose.  
2.5  CONCLUSIONS 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that social cash transfers will increase in use in Africa 
and other developing countries given their conceptual merit as well as the rising evidence of 
their effectiveness in Zambia and elsewhere. Zambia which has not found a workable and 
comprehensive social protection system for the ultra poor should move with this trend. But  
the Department of Social Welfare has taken a sensible approach in not going full scale from the 
beginning but to obtain firs key lessons from a few pilot cases before rolling out. The question 
of capacity at all levels is one that needs to be answered before rollout could be embarked 
upon. This report addresses this issue. 
CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PWAS STRUCTURES 
AND SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER SCHEMES 
3.1  INTRODUCTIONS 
This chapter provides background information about both the PWAS and the social cash 
transfer schemes in terms of their structures and the targeting, payment and approval 
processes they follow. A number of capacity issues in implementing the processes as  
observed in the field are also discussed. This is a precursor to the discussion on the 
institutional, organisational, human resource and fiscal challenges that a national social cash 
transfer system would face, as discussed in the next three chapters. However, because the 
capacity to affect the laid down processes is a function of these three critical areas, they are 
inevitably touched upon where it is necessary without elaboration. 
3.2  THE PWAS STRUCTURE, MANDATES AND TASKS 
3.2.1  PWAS Historical Background Information 
PWAS dates back to the 1950s when it was used to provide assistance to the war veterans.  
It was modified at independence to include needy widows and others identified to need 
assistance recommended to the National Welfare Assistance Committee. Falling allocation  
of funds to PWAS activities as the economy declined led to a virtual abandonment of the 
scheme by the 1990s. It thus needed to be revitalized and in 1997 after an evaluation and 
redesign process, new guidelines were approved to provide for a decentralized community–
based scheme. In its current format PWAS started in 2000 with funding from the European 
Union which supported a four year capacity building project aimed at assisting the MCDSS to 
rollout the redesigned PWAS. In 2005 the project was dissolved and PWAS was mainstreamed 
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PWAS seeks “to provide better services to the vulnerable, by supporting communities that 
care for their vulnerable neighbours and extended families” (MCDSS, PWAS Booklet, undated). 
Target beneficiaries lack capacity to adequately meet their own basic needs for a variety of 
reasons including old age, disability or chronic illness. Operationally, this meant assisting these 
households meet their health, education, food and shelter needs. The immediate objectives  
of PWAS are: 
•  To assist the most vulnerable in society to fulfill their basic needs, particularly 
health, education, food and shelter; and, 
•  To promote community capacity to develop local and externally supported 
initiatives to overcome the problems of extreme poverty and vulnerability.  
 
PWAS has the following operating principles: 
•  Decentralisation, using village and district level mechanisms in the targeting, 
approval and payment process; 
•  Participation, giving voice to community members in the targeting, approval  
and payment process; 
•  Integration, using existing organisations – line ministries, NGOs and CBOs – for 
interventions; and, 
•  Self help, using a cadre of volunteers to make the system operational. 
 
The pilot social cash transfer schemes by choosing to use the PWAS structures have 
effectively adopted these principles as well. It is thus necessary to understand how the 
structure works in order to assess the capacity demands a social cash transfer system  
as generally designed in the pilot schemes would place on them. 
3.2.2  Organisational Structure of PWAS 
District and Sub-District Structures 
The PWAS structure rises from community to national level (see Figure 1) and is said to cover 
about 6,500 communities. It is driven by committees at the district and sub-district levels:  
the District Welfare Assistance Committee (DWAC) at district level, Area Coordinating 
Committee (ACC) at ward level although not always coinciding and Community Welfare 
Assistance Committee (CWAC) at community level. CWAC and ACC members are volunteers 
while DWAC members are representatives of government, council, NGOs and religious 
organisations in the district. Therefore, the PWAS system is heavily dependent on volunteers. 
The system has been designed to fulfil the principles noted above. It is also designed to  
ensure cost effectiveness in the delivery of assistance to the needy. The functionality of the 
committees and the regular DSW structure need to be analysed to understand the needed 
capacity for delivering social cash transfers.                 Country Study  15 
 
Each district has between 60 and 120 CWACs giving PWAS a highly decentralised system 
for delivering assistance and a mechanism for community participation. A CWAC normally has 
up to 500 households, but could be much less in sparsely populated areas.  
FIGURE 1 
The Public Welfare Assistance Scheme Reporting Structure 
 
 
The main role of a CWAC is to identify in collaboration with the traditional leadership, 
households in the area that need public welfare assistance. To fulfil this, two main areas of 
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instruments contained in the PWAS qualifier matrices; and, (ii) Generation of the needed paper 
trail to aid approval and monitoring of the scheme. Field visits indicated that capacity in both 
areas varies from one CWAC to another. CWACs with pilot social cash transfer schemes in the 
area tended to perform better because they benefited from the training that came with the 
introduction of the scheme.3 This helped them to carry their PWAS functions better. It was 
reported in all places visited that the last training on PWAS took place in 2002 or 2003 and 
some of the people trained had since left the committee for various reasons. New members 
were being “trained” by the old ones or given a talk by the DSWO.  
It was thus not surprising that some members found the application of PWAS qualifiers 
somewhat challenging. This was not made easy by the high level of destitution and the small 
amounts of cash disbursed to each CWAC which limited outreach. The few selected 
beneficiaries were largely indistinguishable from many others not selected. Perhaps because  
of this, some communities were reported to be confused with the PWAS means-testing criteria 
leading to complaints and accusations of nepotism in the selection process. This puts pressure 
on CWAC members to rotate PWAS assistance among beneficiaries with each disbursement. 
For coordination, CWACs are grouped together into Area Coordinating Committees 
(ACCs) to facilitate communication, training, monitoring and reporting. The ACCs main role is 
to scrutinize submissions of CWACs before submitting for approval the list of applicants to the 
district. Usually one or two members from each CWAC are selected to be represented on the 
ACC.  In the design it was expected that some ACCs may be hosted by a partner institution 
(GRZ MCDSS, 2000: p.9). Because an ACC exists at the ward level, it is sometimes a sub committee 
of the Area Development Committee (ADC) providing information on issues of public welfare 
assistance. A district has between 10 and 20 ACCs depending on the number of wards.   
There are two key capacity issues at this level. The first is the required technical competence 
by ACC members to guide CWACs in the process as well as build their capacity where necessary. 
Although literacy is higher among ACC members it was said to be an issue here too. The same 
problem of lack of retraining has also affected ACCs. The second is the capacity to carry out 
monitoring in CWACs. Many of ACCs are operationally challenged by the vast areas they  
oversee in this regard. A number have no transport to conduct spot checks of the utilisation of 
distributed materials. Where bicycles were given, there appears to be no proper back up system 
for maintenance. Some members were using their own money to repair the bicycles. Inadequate 
transport was contributed to the low submission of reports by CWACs and ACCs.  
At district level, the District Welfare Assistance Committee (DWAC) oversees all the 
activities. DWAC brings together representatives from relevant Government Departments 
and the Council, as well as partner NGOs, churches and other appropriate institutions  
(GRZ MCDSS, 2000: p.9).  The status of the DWAC in relation to district structures varies from 
district to district. In some districts the DWAC is a subcommittee of the District Development 
Coordinating Committees (DDCC). In others it is merely linked to the social subcommittee of 
the DDCC. This means that there is no single national criteria of how the DWAC is to relate  
to the DDCC. However, it is understood that the role of the DWAC is to provide information 
on issues pertaining to public welfare assistance. The little use of district strategic plans  
since the expiry of the Zambia Social Investment Fund has led to difficulties in how the 
welfare issues are integrated into the overall district development strategies and how 
activities are reported and monitored. The DWAC guides the DSWO which is supposed to 
secure impartiality of the process compared to what would be the case if the process was                Country Study  17 
 
sorely in the hands of individuals at the DSWO. In turn, the DSWO is key in ensuring that the 
targeting process and delivery of assistance to beneficiaries work smoothly. S/he facilitates the 
DWAC to play its role and receives funds from the ministry headquarters for beneficiaries.  
The DSWO reports to the Provincial Social Welfare Office (PSWO) at the province. The main 
functions are to support the DSWOs in the province with the technical interpretation of policy 
and guidelines as well as to support and monitor the management of district activities.  
The PSWO also helps districts in the planning of activities. It liaises with the provincial 
administration especially the Provincial Accounting Control Unit (PACU) which manages the 
government funds in the province. The PSWO represents the DSW on the Social Services  
Sub-Committee of the Provincial Development Coordinating Committee. Recent restructuring 
has seen changes in the PSWO staffing with better qualified people heading the office.  
The number of staff has also been increased. However, inadequate resources for oversight  
and monitoring of activities in districts remain a major constraint at the PSWO.      
At national level, the PWAS falls under the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) in the 
MCDSS headed by a director of social welfare. The DSW at headquarters’ main function is to 
provide policy direction and leadership in social protection and coordination of functions with 
other MCDSS departments and other ministries.  
A Sector Advisory Group on Social Protection (SP-SAG) chaired by the PS MCDSS is the 
main forum of interaction between MCDSS, other ministries (health, education and labour), 
donors and NGOs. The Minister with support of the Permanent Secretary leads the MCDSS  
in advocacy and the engagement of the political leadership in matters of social protection. 
Technical Working Groups (TWG) reporting to the SP-SAG have been established to deal with 
particular issues related to the implementation of the SPS. The SP-SAG reports to the Policy 
and Economic Management Department (PEMD) in the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning (MFNP). There is a TWG on Social Assistance (TWG-SA) hosted and chaired by the 
Director of Social Welfare (DSW). It is coordinating the development of a national social 
assistance programme. The TWG-SA reports to the SP-SAG on a regular basis. 
3.2.3  PWAS Mandates and Tasks 
The DSW functions are broadly classified under statutory (i.e. those that deal with the 
enforcement of statutory provisions such as the Juveniles Act) and non-statutory (i.e. those 
that are not regulated by law). PWAS functions fall in the latter category. The implementation 
of non-statutory functions is guided by policy. A key weakness in this regard is that PWAS  
(and social cash transfers by implication) is linked to a Social Welfare Policy which is yet  
to be endorsed and adopted by Cabinet. This has led some to question whether the DSW has 
adequate mandate in carrying out its PWAS activities. Policy uncertainty is seen from the fact 
that the Aging Policy is still only a draft and it is unclear whether this will be incorporated into 
the Social Welfare Policy.  
However, PWAS is well supported by the Social Protection Strategy (SPS) adopted in 2005 
(MCDSS, April 2005). Its overall objective is “to contribute to the security of all Zambians by 
ensuring that incapacitated and low capacity households and people have sufficient income 
security to meet their basic needs, and protection from the worst impacts of risks and shocks” 
(ibid, p.17). The SPS seeks to link up existing piecemeal programmes into a coherent strategy 
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assistance. In turn, the SPS has been integrated in the Fifth National Development Plan. 
Objective 2 of FNDP Chapter 22 on Social Protection is “to reduce extreme poverty in 
incapacitated households through welfare support”. 
Therefore, delays in the finalization of a policy on social welfare is somewhat 
ameliorated by the SPS and FNDP both which recognize PWAS and its structures. Although 
there are many social protection schemes in Zambia, the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme 
(PWAS) has the most elaborate structure, rising from community to national level covering 
sixty-three districts of Zambia.4 It is thus possible to envisage different social protection 
schemes with wide coverage utilizing the existing PWAS structures. The utilization of the 
PWAS structures in pilot SCTS and the planned rollout is based on this merit. This is  
further made possible by the fact that PWAS vision and objectives are broad enough  
to accommodate many social protection schemes. The vision is to empower  
communities to allocate welfare resources to the vulnerable in their midst.  
To be eligible under PWAS, a household should be classified as incapacitated and 
therefore not able to meet its own basic needs perhaps due to youth, old age, sickness  
or disability. Priority is given where survival itself is at risk or to households unable to offer 
adequate care to orphans and vulnerable children (GRZ MCDSS, 2000: p.9). Households are 
assessed against a combination of three categories of qualifiers; social, economic and other 
qualifiers, usually related to the level of entrenched poverty. PWAS had by 2004 reached 
90,054 households. But this is only a fraction of the households estimated to be highly 
vulnerable across the country. Nevertheless, PWAS has managed to target relevant clients  
for the different levels of assistance. It has also been said to have succeeded in effectively 
identifying destitute households. Most communities are therefore receptive and interested in 
participating in PWAS.  
3.3  THE SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER PROCESS 
A generic targeting, approval and payment process for social cash transfer schemes is provided 
in Figure 2 (page 19). This process was developed for the Kalomo SCTS and has been adopted 
by the other pilot schemes. It has also been refined over time to respond to lessons of 
implementation. Below is a brief description of the three main elements of the social cash 
transfer delivery process and an assessment of the capacity implications for each element. 
3.3.1  Outreach and Targeting Process 
Steps in the outreach and targeting process are given in Table 1 (page 20). This takes place at 
community level where the main PWAS structure is the CWAC. Some weaknesses at this level 
observed above, such as the low capacity to generate adequate paper trail, are rectified 
through the training of the CWACs, a one off session at the start of the process. However, there 
were a number of problems that undermined the efficacy of the process. The low level of 
literacy was an enduring constraint that affected the quality of the paper trail that the system 
expects to be generated. Although the quality of reports generated by CWACs in pilot SCTS 
was better than in areas with only the regular PWAS, field visits and verification showed that 
the quality was low everywhere except in a few cases.   
Emphasis for capacity building has tended to focus on CWAC responsibilities with little 
focus on the duties and skills required for the ACC.  The ACC was at first not given an explicit                Country Study  19 
 
role in the targeting, approval and payment process. However, the need for it to play a role  
has been getting increasingly recognised as the implementation of the pilot schemes has 
progressed particularly providing oversight to CWACs and helping out with conflict resolution. 
More recently, some ACC members have been more active in training of new CWACs.  
FIGURE 2 



























Source: Ministry of Community Development and Social Services and German Technical Cooperation,  
September, 2007, Figure 5. 
 
Nevertheless, it was found that the link between ACCs and CWACs tended to be weak 
thereby which undermined the intensity and quality of supervision, monitoring and reporting 
at community level. The limited number of trainers and the geographical spread of the 
beneficiaries has negatively affected the level of oversight, and thereby the amount of support 
and guidance given to CWAC members in the identification, interviewing and beneficiary 
verification process. 
This is not to imply that the targeting process itself has been more straight forward than 
the experience under regular PWAS. The Katete SCTS being a universal scheme has the least 
problems because its means-testing is simple requiring only evidence for age and residence. 
But when initiating the scheme, a problem of what to do about people who had lost the 
national identity card was encountered. Some poor households appeared to lack the  
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means to have the identity cards replaced. Others had used a wrong age for whatever reason 
to get their national identity card. CWAC members were at a loss what to do when they knew 
that these people were actually older than their cards said. Proof for residence was also not 
straight forward. Village registers were not updated for a long time. In the scaling up to nine 
more wards, a verification exercise noted that: “some village registers are not up-to date.  
This was contributed mainly by the high illiteracy levels among most village headpersons  
as they are not able to read and write making it difficult for them to update registers. It was 
surprising in certain instances the headman was not in the village register”.5 The eligibility  
of the residence status of these individuals had to be confirmed with the village headmen  
and fellow villagers.  
TABLE 1 
Steps in Outreach and Targeting Process 
Step Description  Key  Activities 
1  Community 
Information 
Meeting 
−  Informing community members of the scheme, its intentions,  
who is eligible, the process and who is to be involved  
−  Where there is no functioning CWAC, one is put in place.  
−  Training of the CWAC in the process and how to use the selection criteria.  
2  Listing of 
Households 
−  Listing of households needing help using the following criteria: (i) Extremely 
needy; (ii) Incapacitated; (iii) No valuable assets; and, (iv) No regular & 
substantial sources of income.  
−  Information is based on CWAC members’ own knowledge. 
−  Listing done at a CWAC meeting   
3  Interview of 
Households 
−  2 CWAC members visit and interview each listed household and fill in an 
application form 
4  Headman’s 
Validation of 
Information  
−  Headman countersigns the application form to indicate that  
information is correct 
5  CWAC Ranking 
of Selected 
Households 
−  Collected information is discussed in detail at a CWAC meeting.   
After deleting households not meeting criteria, the rest are ranked 
according to the extent to which perceived to need assistance.  
6  Community 
Meeting 
−  Community members validate the selection of households and their ranking 
by the CWAC. Changes are made if necessary.  
 
In general, CWACS in pilot SCTS areas appeared to handle the means-testing instruments 
better than in areas with only the regular-PWAS due to training and the more intensive 
backstopping they received from the scheme. The DSWO was better funded to play a more 
meaningful and consistent role. But here too there were complaints of favouritism, nepotism 
and corruption. The extent to which this was reported varied from place to place.  
The system was said to have had very high inclusion error. Estimates varied greatly, 15 to 
40 per cent of the beneficiaries were said not to qualify.6A deeper analysis of this problem 
reveals a number of things. Such a high inclusion error if it is to be believed indicates a serious 
problem in the targeting process. In particular it shows the failure of the voice mechanism that 
has been so carefully worked into the process. The “culture of silence” was reported in all the 
pilot districts. People just did not want to be known as the ones who had another person                Country Study  21 
 
excluded. The second community meeting failed due to this but also as a result of apathy by 
those not on the list of recommended beneficiaries in the first place. They knew that they were 
not on the list if they were not interviewed and thought it pointless to go to a meeting just to 
scrutinise others. It is for this reason that in the Chipata and Kazungula schemes the second 
meeting was left out all together. But then Chipata had the highest number of complaints 
which could be partly attributed to the fact that transparency was not as adequate. It is 
therefore not clear that there are sufficient alternative accessible avenues for people to speak 
out. Although there are forms provided for lodging complaints, these are rarely used because 
they require a certain degree of literacy.  
Although the existence of nepotism and corruption could not be denied given the clear 
evidence presented, it also appeared to be overblown. The spectre of the selected 10 per cent 
being indistinguishable from their unselected neighbours who felt that they had been unfairly 
left out and subsequently complained could also be seen here. In many places it seems that 
the number of incapacitated households as defined by the means-testing criteria used 
exceeded the 10% ceiling.  Households that thought they were eligible were anxiously waiting 
for the re-registration exercise which at first was to take place after one year. To their 
disappointment the period was extended to three years. They had hoped to qualify the next 
time round. However it’s not clear what per centage is likely to graduate off the SCTS, and 
there was fear of penalising those who had improved their circumstances by removing them 
from the SCTS when they still required assistance. In case of the Chipata SCTS, the Regional 
Hunger and Vulnerability Programme Study brought further confusion because it interviewed 
a sample of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Some non-beneficiary households took 
this as an exercise in retargeting and thought they had been identified for possible application. 
Unfortunately even some CWAC members felt they were as entitled to assistance as those 
they were assisting. In a few cases, CWAC members resigned their position so that they could 
benefit from the scheme. Those that remained complained of how painful it was to help others 
get the cash while facing difficulties to feed their own families. The temptation to be corrupt in 
such an environment is high. It is further fed by the ignorance of some recipients who think 
that CWAC members do them a favour by including them on the list and hence their 
willingness to “show some appreciation”. Some interviewees suggested that corruption may 
have been higher in Chipata because people in urban areas are generally more corrupt than in 
rural areas. But it could also be said that because they are urban dwellers, they were more likely 
to take up their dissatisfaction with the DSWO, the Permanent Secretary, councillors and 
Members of Parliament. Their proximity seemed to facilitate this.    
3.3.2  Approval Process 
Steps in the approval process are provided in Table 2 (page 22). Applications need to be 
sufficiently scrutinised to minimise inclusion error and hence the importance of good  
quality information. This is only as good to the extent that the CWAC and the ACC perform 
their work well. 
After approval, information on the applicants needs to be entered in the database which 
is the basis for generating the necessary paper trail for budgeting, requesting and releasing of 
funds. The inputting of data and maintenance of correct information places high demand on 
the district officers’ time and the need for computer equipment. Some districts did not have 
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literacy and the need for the database system to work well. In all the pilot districts visited, the 
system was yet to start working well and needed to be refined if it was to really reduce some of 
the operational burden of the scheme. For example, the Kalomo DSWO had difficulties with 
the database when it was first introduced and found itself spending more time than when it 
depended on its manual information system.  
TABLE 2 
Steps in the Approval Process 
Step Description  Key  Activities 
1  ACC Verification of 
Application Forms 
−  The ACC Chairperson (or his/her deputy) and secretary go 
through the list submitted to determine the completeness, 
consistency and correctness of the information 
2  Pre-DWAC Meeting  −  The DSWO sitting with (a minimum of) two DWAC members 
goes through the list to approve submission by the CWAC. 
Two CWAC representatives present to provide explanations. 
−  Meeting refers difficult case to the full DWAC 
3  DWAC Meeting  −  DSWO explain decisions taken at the pre-DWAC meeting 
−  Full DWAC meeting discusses the difficult cases referred to it 
by the pre-DWAC meeting 
4  Informing Applicants of 
the Outcome 
−  The CWAC informs both successful and unsuccessful 
applicants of the outcome. 
 
Headquarters using consultants was trying to rectify the problem. In addition, a senior 
planner was assigned to focus on issues to do with the Management Information System. 
However, he appears to have been sidetracked by other duties subsequently assigned to him 
which have left little chance for him to focus on MIS issues. 
3.3.3  District Financial Allocations and Payment System 
The process described in Table 3 (page 23) has undergone a number of changes arising from 
experience. The payment process when first introduced in Kalomo proved cumbersome and 
taxed heavily the capacities of all the actors involved in the process. Accounts were opened for 
each beneficiary at the bank and s/he was expected to collect the money once the account 
had been credited. This was a lot of paper work for the DSWO which had to issue the necessary 
instructions. Each beneficiary living within a radius of 15 kilometres had to travel to the district 
centre where the bank was located. Some beneficiaries were very frail and found this very 
punishing. For the rest, the DSWO made arrangements by delivering the transfers itself to 
designated places. The distances were still long. 
The bank failed to cope with an influx of beneficiaries withdrawing money on the same 
date. Many beneficiaries were illiterate and needed assistance to complete their withdrawal 
slips thus demanding more personal attention than the bank was able to provide. Bank staff 
were exasperated by this phenomenon and feared that the crowding and slow process of 
dealing with the payments discouraged their other clients. Furthermore, although it was 
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automated system of this procedure failed to skip these accounts and charges were imposed 
thereby somewhat reducing the amount that beneficiaries collected.      
TABLE 3 
Steps in the Payment Process 
Step Description  Key  Activities 
1  Establishment of Pay 
Points  
−  The DSWO establishes the pay point and appoints a pay point 
manager usually an officer from the Ministry of Education or 
Ministry of Health operating in the area.  
−  Names of household heads and their alternates are given to 
the pay point manager together with the amounts to be 
received every month  
2  Transfer of Funds From 
HQ to District 
−  Funds are transferred into a DWAC account. There is a 
separate account for administration expenses.   
3  Transfer of Funds to Pay 
Points 
−  The DSWO with authorisation by the DWAC raises a cheque 
to the Pay Point Manager who cashes it at the bank 
4  Collection of Funds by 
Beneficiaries 
−  Beneficiaries are informed about the funds arrival and asked to 
collect it at specified date and time.  
−  Payment of funds is witnessed by two CWAC representatives 
5  Accounting for the Funds  −  Pay point managers completes the necessary reconciliation 
documentation  
 
With these difficulties, it was decided to extend the localised pay point system to include 
areas that were less than 15 kilometres from the bank as well. At the same time, funds were to be 
paid bi-monthly rather than monthly. This decongested the banks and meant that beneficiaries 
walked a shorter distance as they received payment within their areas, although for some it was 
still considered a long distance given their state of health. Payment point managers are 
supposed to get an allowance of K50,000 plus the actual transport refund for each round of 
payment and reimbursed their travel costs. The process is also made transparent by the 
attendance of CWAC representatives who would note the households that have not collected 
their transfer and make follow up. Although security concerns have been raised and discussed, 
particularly when there are large sums due to the delays, thus far no loss has been reported.  
The Chipata scheme did not follow these lessons from Kalomo and only began to change 
to the pay point system at the time of the assessment.  
At the district level, the payment process requires strong financial administration. All the 
DSWOs interviewed indicated that this was one area that required capacity enhancement by 
employing an officer who would do the accounting. Strengthening the existing officers’ 
capacities in basic accounting will also be helpful even it would not resolve the concerns entirely.  
Financial accountability is overseen by the Provincial Accounting Control Unit (PACU) 
whose mandate is to ensure that funds are spent according to GRZ guidelines and the 
programmes budget. It works to try and prevent misappropriation of funds. But process 
difficulties at this point have also worked to delay the use of funds sometimes. Before the 
districts could start the payment process, the PSWO and the PACU have to give approval.  
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situations do face delays because of manpower constraints at the PACU. In Eastern Province, 
the accountant attending to SCT is currently managing 8 accounts (for different ministries and 
programmes). If all the districts come on board, the accounts are likely to suffer and may need 
to offload some work to some others within PACU to concentrate more on SCT.  
3.3.4  Monitoring and Reporting 
Each tier of the structure is to produce reports for the next tier above it every 2 months  
based on the approved plans and budgets.  At the community level [CWAC and ACC] their 
production has been hampered by the low literacy levels and therefore the dependence on 
government officers/trainers in the vicinity to support their generation.  Submission rates  
from the community levels are low [as low as 40 per cent was indicated] but the reports  
seem regular from the district and provincial offices. Feedback seems limited to between  
the provincial and district levels and this mostly through telephone calls especially when 
clarification is sought. Inadequate feedback at various levels has had adverse implications  
for sustained generation and quality of reports. 
The Chipata and Katete schemes do not make the reporting by CWACs a necessity, 
although the members go out to check on beneficiaries in terms of how the money is utilised. 
Nevertheless, the DSWO is expected to report to the PSWO on a monthly basis and the PSWO 
submits a report to the HQ every quarter. To facilitate this, the DSWO visits a selection of 
CWACs every month in the company of some DWAC members. They interview households  
as well.  However the field visits do not appear to be structured or based on any tools for 
estimating quantitative or qualitative outputs or impacts.  The collection of information  
relies on personal impressions.   
3.4  CONCLUSIONS 
The elaborate PWAS structure offers great opportunity to rollout the social cash transfer 
system throughout the country without going through the process of establishing a parallel 
system. The structure appears robust enough to adapt itself to a democratic decentralisation 
system of government as envisaged in the National Decentralisation Policy of 2002 and there is 
therefore little risk that it would face disruption once decentralisation is under way.  
But the discussion above has revealed a number of capacity challenges that need to be 
attended to as part of a rollout strategy. These include the following: 
1.  PWAS structures in some areas have become dysfunctional due to inadequate 
resources and would need to be revitalised before rollout. This would include  
re-establishing the committees where members have ceased to participate for  
one reason or another.  
2.  Both new and old committees at various levels would need to be trained at the 
start as part of introduction of the SCT system in the area. However, even more 
importantly is a plan for continuous training to ensure understanding of the 
committees remains up to date all the time. But this has financial implications.  
In the case of PWAS, this has been the main difficulty for continuous re-training or 
for changing committees after a specified time period because new members will 
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3.  Simplification of the means-testing criteria to meet the low literacy levels among 
community volunteers. From the discussion above, the Katete SCTS model poses 
less difficulties to administer given the capacity available in the DSWO and the 
PWAS partners. However, whether it has high inclusion and exclusion errors 
should be determined first. This simplification should also take into account  
a check system as to avoid corruption. 
4.  Establishing a simple participatory monitoring and evaluation system which 
systematises the collection of information at community level and allows for 
comparison in terms of performance between communities and districts. 
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF THE ORGANISATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF PWAS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Organisational capacity has two major aspects. To begin with is an assessment of resources 
available to the MCDSS to fulfil its mandate on social protection. This is taken up in the  
next two chapters that discuss the human resource capacity and expenditures.  The second  
aspect assesses the monitoring system to analyse the extent to which it is able to provide the 
necessary information for strategic management decisions to steer social protection functions.  
The description of the SCTS delivery system in the last chapter provides the background 
for analysing the organisational and institutional capacity implications of adopting a social 
cash transfer scheme in a district.  
4.2  THE MCDSS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY  
4.2.1  The MCDSS leadership in Social Protection 
A national social cash transfer system to be effective requires strong leadership at national 
level. By leadership is meant the ability of the organisation with the mandate for promoting 
social protection in this case to devise the necessary policies, mobilise needed resources  
and coordinate the different players who must play a role with a view of heightening the 
impact of their actions on the beneficiaries. Leadership is therefore dependent on the place  
an organisation occupies within the national institutional architecture. It is also a function  
of the internal (organisational) capacity that provides the ability to effect its mandate.  
In the case of social protection, the mandate to provide leadership on social protection is 
given to the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS). The MCDSS HQ 
fed by the Department of Social Welfare needs to mobilise key actors to support the system 
including other ministries and departments. Apart from the Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services, other key organisations include other line ministries  
(e.g. Labour, Agriculture, Health and Education), the Ministry of Finance and National  
Planning (MoFNP), grant funded organisations like the National AIDS Council, donor 
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Figure 3 is the national institutional framework within which planning for and monitoring 
of social protection activities take place. To ensure that there is adequate flow of resources, 
therefore, the MCDSS must contribute to the national development plan and justify how its 
planned activities help to achieve the overarching goal of the plan. Through existing structures 
from community to national level, the MCDSS is able to obtain the necessary information for 
planning process. Through a consultative process, this information must be sieved with that 
coming from other sectors so that planned activities are not duplicating or being undermined 
by what is being planned elsewhere. At the national level, the Sector Advisory Group on Social 
Protection (SP-SAG) has emerged as an important channel for wide-ranging consultation  
and stakeholder participation regarding social protection issues.  
Technical working groups (TWG) reporting to the SP-SAG deal with particular issues 
related to the implementation of the SPS. There is a TWG on Social Assistance (TWG-SA) hosted 
and chaired by the Director of Social Welfare (DSW) in the MCDSS which has been coordinating 
the development of a national social assistance programme.  The TWG-SA reports to the  
SP-SAG on a regular basis. The SP-SAG reports to the Policy and Economic Management 
Department (PEMD) in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNP). The fact that  
the SP-SAG was established with the support of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
makes it extremely important. All SAGs including the SP-SAG have the following objectives:  
1.  To define sector priorities in line with the overall priorities set in the national 
planning documents; 
2.  To look at, and debate, the detailed budget allocations, the MTEF  
as well as the annual Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB), within the sectors. 
3.  To take the lead role in organising the monitoring and evaluation process. 
 
With this mandate, the SP-SAG went on to formulate in 2005 a Social Protection Strategy 
which was an important input into the Fifth National Development Programme’s chapter on 
social protection. The SP-SAG has shown its strategic importance in carrying out consultations 
and studies through the Technical Working Group on Social Assistance which has outlined a 
learning agenda and rollout plan as mentioned before. However, concern was raised that the 
process failed to secure both external and internal ownership and commitment regarding the 
social protection agenda (DFID, 2005, p.30).  
That MCDSS has problems rallying technocratic and political support around a coherent 
agenda of social protection is also seen in the fact that a Social Welfare Policy has been  
under development for the past four years. There is yet no broad based support for social 
protection, surprisingly even among NGOs advocating for poverty reduction. The Ministry  
of Finance is still unconvinced. Other line ministries continue to protect their areas and are 
not collaborating effectively with the MCDSS. Social protection programmes are too thinly 
scattered in various ministries. Larger ministries such as Finance, Health, and Education are 
able to marshal a lot of support.   
 
FIGURE 3 
Social Protection and the National Planning and Monitoring Process 
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4.2.2  Inter-PWAS Relationships and Coordination 
National level coordination mechanisms have been discussed above. What emerges is that 
there is an elaborate institutional framework for social protection in general and PWAS in 
particular rising from community to national level. This requires a strong coordination capacity 
by the MCDSS at every level.  
The elaborate and inclusive coordination structure potentially provides ample 
opportunities for the MCDSS to sell and allow other agencies to buy into its agenda. 
Unfortunately this potential for coordination is not fully utilized. This is because coordination  
is weakest at the national level which is supposed to give direction to the lower structures.  
The establishment of SP-SAG helped to improve things somewhat but development planning 
and implementation in the country is still sector driven despite efforts to adopt a thematic 
approach in the FNDP.  
At the district level, coordination appears better but varies from district to district 
depending on the strength of the DDCC.8 Where it works well, the DDCC has gone a long way 
in mitigating some of the difficulties faced by the DSWO. At sub-district level where ACC liaises 
with the Area Development Committee, the main institutional challenge is that ADCs although 
they have existed for a long time in some districts are a new phenomenon in most districts. 
Their formation is a result of the drive to decentralize government as stipulated in the 
Decentralisation Policy of 2002 but decentralisation has stalled and fallen far behind schedule.9  
Below the sub-district where the CWAC operates, inter-PWAS coordination are  
much more informal and not guided by formally stipulated guidelines. What drives these 
arrangements is the strong social solidarity and culture to help fellow community members in 
distress. Therefore, the extended family system is an important institution at community level 
that plays a big role in social safety nets at this level. Traditional leaders have a recognised  
role to play particularly in mobilising the community to help the needy. But the deepening 
vulnerability context of poverty, HIV&AIDS and long term trends and shocks have seriously 
tested these and exposed the extent to which community level social capital could be 
mobilized to effectively ameliorate the vulnerability of others. In the words of the District  
Social Welfare Officer for Kasempa, “the community does mobilise itself to help the vulnerable. 
However, there is a limit to which this can happen because there are too many vulnerable 
people while community members able to help are too few”. 
Many committees exist at this level created by donor funded projects, line ministries  
and NGOs. Focus Group Discussions many times pointed out that the church is a respected 
institution at community level with a strong role in social welfare services. These are all  
playing an important role in addressing the plight of the vulnerable people in communities. 
Committee members tend to be the same people from one committee to another.10 There is 
also a strong culture of volunteerism and people appear to get a sense of status in belonging 
to various committees.  
In one FGD in Kasempa, those present indicated that they belonged to between two  
to four committees. This is an advantage in a situation where there is no forum for  
information sharing. Village Development Committees (VDCs) that were supposed to 
coordinate development at community level are weak bodies and barely acknowledged in 
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for time placed on such committee members is very high with participation. Furthermore, 
given the lack of harmonization in incentives between committees, the work programme of 
one committee is at times disrupted by the work programme of another with better incentives 
because members give priority to the latter whenever its activities are being implemented. 
Chapter Five discusses this problem and shows how CWAC members choose to give more 
attention to the work of other committees where they somewhat get compensated unlike 
under PWAS.   
4.3  THE PWAS MONITORING AND MIS 
Capacity in monitoring and management information systems allows an organisation to  
take management strategic decisions regarding programme implementation. For social cash 
transfers, effective routine reporting processes are as important as initiating the scheme itself. 
Adequate flow of information is required regarding the allocation of transfers, receipt by 
beneficiaries and the performance of the scheme with respect to its goal and objectives.  
In all the pilot schemes, officers are spending considerable amount of time to achieve this.  
The PWAS has a well elaborated reporting system targeted at financial allocations, 
resource provision and beneficiary targeting and receipts. Data aggregation and provincial 
performance reports are produced at provincial level before submission to the HQ.  
However, in practice the monitoring system has a number of weaknesses and needs 
substantial strengthening.  
1.  Monitoring is supposed to be undertaken on a quarterly basis. But this takes place 
once in a while (when need arises) due mainly to two reasons – transport and 
funding. There is inadequate logistical support (transport and funds), particularly 
at district and sub-district levels. Provision of transport by government to some 
PSWOs in 2007 went a long way in improving transport at provincial level but 
there are still a number without adequate access to transport. A general lack of 
transport at district and sub-district levels is a major constraint in having a 
functional PWAS M&E system.  
2.  The big time gap between release and availability of funds besides being too low 
compared to budgeted amounts undermines the credibility of the M&E system. 
Planned activities cannot be reported upon systematically and regularly. This has 
been exacerbated by the failure by DSW HQ to communicate to PSWO funding 
schedules to districts. Until December 2007, PSWOs depended on quarterly 
reports of the DSWOs for this kind of information. 
3.  Baseline indicators are not fully identified and systematic data collection and 
analysis aimed at assessing performance is severely lacking. There has been no 
evaluation of PWAS after its redesign to assess how it has worked and incorporate 
its lessons the in the future refocusing of programme. A system that captures, 
consolidates and analyses data to provide overall picture on the social protection 
interventions in the country and the proportions attributed to PWAS in that total 
picture with respect to a number of critical variables such as cost and the total 
number of beneficiaries is absent. This is critical for effective coordination and 
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4.  Dissemination of monitoring information lacks pro-activity, regularity and 
sufficient stakeholder coverage. There is little or no evidence of monitoring 
information aimed at informing policy formulation.  
5.  As already seen, the generation of quality paper trail is constrained by the low 
literacy rates prevailing at sub-district level unless in situations where government 
officials are co-opted in CWACs.    
6.  At all levels, but particularly at national level which must set the pace, there is a 
lack of methodological and organizational know how in M&E, impact monitoring 
and methods and techniques of process and structure organization. There is need 
to train all staff in M&E at district level as there are inadequate skills. Communities 
lack methodological support in the areas of participative data compilation and 
decision making techniques.  
7.  The current staff establishment is over-stretched to pay sufficient attention to 
routine functions that monitoring entails. 
 
All the districts visited maintain a manual system for information filing and retrieval.  
The MCDSS has specified a filing index for the PWAS and other activities paper trail. 
Nevertheless some provinces have not operationalised this filing index because of lack  
of resources to train DSWO staff.11 The operational manual for SCT has specified a number of 
forms that need to be filled at various stages of the targeting, approval and payment process 
which form a part of the management information system once stored. A computerised 
system had been designed and was being tried in Kalomo. However, by April 2008, serious 
problems were being encountered with the system as noted above. What this indicates is that 
a full scale computerised management information system would not work well given the 
difficulties of designing and operationalising the system. Some districts do not even have 
computers although there were efforts to procure such computers at the time of the study. 
4.4  RESOURCES AND THE FUNCTIONALITY OF PWAS 
4.4.1  The Sufficiency of Funds 
Field observations indicate that the functionality of PWAS has been seriously undermined by 
the low and erratic funding discussed in Chapter 6. Although funding and the regularity of 
disbursements improved in 2007, the amounts are still too small to have any significant impact 
on the target group.  
Accordingly, the amount of funds for the administration of PWAS is very small. Districts 
are allowed 10 per cent of the disbursed funds for this purpose. For Kasempa and Mufumbwe, 
this amounted to only K450,000 per month, less than enough for a full tank of fuel.  
Another 10 per cent is meant for the ACCs for same purpose.  
In the past, PWAS (particularly at national level) brought about an improvement in the 
flow of welfare support to communities from other sources. Though PWAS does have the 
potential to mobilize resources from other sources, it has lacked pro-activity and creativity to 
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annual work plan and budget, with specific resources set aside for it. A concern has been 
expressed that although some of the PWAS’schemes were pilots, no information concerning 
the lessons learnt was captured and disseminated. 
4.4.2  Physical Assets and Infrastructure 
The state of physical assets and infrastructure in districts was very poor at the time of field work 
which seriously undermined PWAS functionality and would make the implementation of social 
cash transfer difficult in many districts which lacked even the basic equipment needed to 
function effectively.  
4.5  CONCLUSIONS 
The MCDSS faces great organisational and institutional challenges to operate effective social 
protection interventions within the PWAS framework. At the top is the weak space that MCDSS 
occupies in the wider GRZ institutional framework to be an effective champion of social 
protection agenda and policy. This is mainly derived from the low priority that political elites 
accord social protection in general and the absence of national pressure for the government  
to act in the interest of the extreme poor. As a result, MCDSS is under-funded given that the 
Ministry of Finance and other key players are not fully persuaded of the economic merits 
of social transfers. A vicious cycle has been created. Even if an elaborate structure for 
coordination and consultation exists from national to community level, an under-funded 
MCDSS is organisationally weak to implement social protection activities and effectively 
mobilise and coordinate other players who must play a role.  
CHAPTER 5: ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN CAPACITY OF PWAS 
This chapter assesses the human resource capacity needed to run social cash transfers on a 
national scale. It assesses the adequacy of current staffing levels and their incentive to perform. 
And because PWAS is a system driven by committees at district and sub-district level, their 
capacity to support the system is assessed as well. A clear observation arising from this analysis 
is that PWAS faces serious human resource constraints. To rollout the social cash transfer 
schemes to cover the whole country would require a serious effort to recruit more staff and 
develop and motivate them to perform to the highest standard. The recruitment of the right 
type of people of the appropriate calibre also applies to the DWAC, ACC and CWAC. 
5.1  THE ADEQUACY OF STAFFING LEVELS 
The Department of Social Welfare is understaffed. In urban districts, staff spend more time on 
statutory functions, estimated at up to 90% of total time while in rural districts, the opposite 
is true (i.e. more time is spent on non statutory functions). A uniform structure throughout the 
country except for a few key districts has been found inappropriate. The new structure which is 
being negotiated with the Public Service Management Division proposes to change this.  
Except for Lusaka, the rest of the provinces do not have the full manpower establishment. 
This is particularly so for remote provinces. Nevertheless a restructuring process has been 
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But a number have already left due to poor conditions of service (low salaries, lack of equipment, 
poor office accommodation).  
When the Kalomo SCTS was initiated, it was recognised that the key factor for success or 
failure of the scheme would be the management and problem solving capacity of the district 
level staff (Schubert and Goldberg, 2004, p.6). It was observed that high standards were 
required with regard to leadership, problem solving, clear division of tasks and functions, 
internal and external communication and professional office management. Therefore, the 
quality and quantity of district and provincial level staff needed to be consistent with all the 
tasks to be performed.  
Many people reported to feel that the demands (in terms of human resources) for social 
cash transfer schemes are high and their design underestimated this. District officers running 
pilot SCTS were united in acknowledging that the workload was excessive. As a result of the 
high demand, other services provided by DSW have suffered, and the officers have had to 
draw significantly on support from its sister department and other parts of government and 
non government partners, as well as the community to implement the scheme. The necessity 
to develop working partnerships has led to more integration and coordination of initiatives 
at district level.     
It must be recognised that these staff constraints are being experienced when PWAS is 
not performing at full scale due to its serious under-funding. One possible change is to reduce 
on the regularity of targeting so that a given number of beneficiaries could be helped for a 
longer period of time. This would have to change the nature of assistance to make it more 
comprehensive rather than focus on just one or two material items. However, even with such 
changes, introducing social cash transfer would still overstretch staff capacity in the district 
and to a certain extent at the province. District Social Welfare Officers and one other officer are 
spending over 50 per cent of their time on the SCTS. They cope only because the regular PWAS 
is not functioning at full capacity. 
The TWG-SA acknowledges this problem and has suggested a reformation of the regular 
PWAS in order to have the current level of capacity at DSWO meet more adequately the SCT 
demands (see MCDSS, July 2007, p.24). It recognises that the schemes have the same target 
group, targeting structures and selection qualifiers. Beneficiaries of cash transfers spend their 
money on most of the needs that PWAS tries to address. It is suggested that PWAS should 
instead focus on stranded persons such as ex prisoners and victims of minor disaster. PWAS 
could also cater for huge expenditures that cannot be met from the small amounts of social 
cash transfers. These include secondary school fees, particularly boarding fees, and specialized 
medical treatment. 
Under the recent restructuring process of the DSW, the PSWO and DSWO12 should  
hold a university degree and the ASWO should have a diploma. This is in a bid to push up the 
technical and management capacity at these levels and bring the positions in line with what 
is obtaining in other line ministries. New officers are being recruited and this has brought 
about a sense of uncertainty among the old officers. In some cases, there are conflicts 
between the old and new officers. Despite the new recruits it is not certain how consistent 
this will be and whether they could be retained given the poor working environment in 
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to accommodate the changes, build on existing capacity, investing in individuals to help 
retain them and to maintain motivation if there has to be a sufficient level of sustained 
capacity to implement the SCTS.  
Financial management was recognised as a particular weakness from district to national 
level.  This is felt to be a critical omission that needs to be addressed to maintain the scheme’s 
credibility and continuity of transfers. It was recommended that additional financial officers be 
incorporated, particularly at provincial levels.  
Although the PACU exists at provincial level, it is felt that as the unit serves so many 
departments, with the increasing demands of DSW, it would be best to have dedicated financial 
staff with sufficient programme knowledge to provide appropriate and more effective support.  
5.1.1  Committees Incentive to Perform 
For a system so dependent on committees and their army of volunteers, it is necessary  
to assess their motivation to perform. The DWAC existing at district level consists of 
representatives from government departments, NGOs and religious organisations.  
Because membership is by organisation, they are strictly speaking not volunteers. However 
they perceive themselves to be attending to this duty in their individual capacity which has 
influenced their expectations for participating in PWAS. CWAC and ACC members at sub-
district level are volunteers using private time to engage in PWAS activities. Both groups  
need to be motivated to actively participate in the activities of their respective committees. 
Lack of incentives is an issue particularly because other government supported 
programmes gave something to members of their community based committees. Often cited 
were the committees under the home based care programme and the Ministry of Health – the 
Neighbourhood Health Committees. It was said that PWAS activities were negatively affected 
whenever they coincide with those where some payment is given. There is more commitment 
to Neighbourhood Health Committees because of the so called transport reimbursements that 
committee members get after attending meetings. CWAC members thus suggested that they 
should also be given something as an appreciation.  
Many CWAC members indicated that they did not have the resources/tools to conduct 
their (voluntary) work, so they have to depend on their own resources, limit what they do or 
get resources from else where. Payments have been made (in Kalomo) related to the delivery 
of monitoring forms/reports.   
In all fairness, CWAC members did not look at material or cash rewards as the only 
motivation that they would appreciate.  Opportunities to learn such as through workshops to 
continually orient and expose them to new things they should be doing would be appreciated. 
Tools to assist them in their work and items to help identify them and increase their level of 
recognition were mentioned as additional aspects that would motivate them. Other things are 
meaningful resources to carryout PWAS work effectively, bicycles, protective clothing like gum 
boots and raincoats to work even when it is raining. Despite all the complaints about lack of 
incentives, one independent observer who has worked with the Kakikasa CWAC in Mufumbwe 
and attended the FGD suggested that social status is a factor and a motivation of being in a 
committee. This explains why these volunteers continue to hang on despite the lack of 
incentives. What is not clear is whether this is enough to sustain a high work rate  
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5.2  CONCLUSIONS 
The shortage of staff in the DSW to implement PWAS and other welfare activities is a key 
constraint to the plan to rollout social cash transfers. DSWOs in most districts are struggling  
to carry on the PWAS activities even though the system is operating at very low level due to 
under-funding. One of the key criteria for rolling out social cash transfers that there should be 
is the required number of staff at the DSWO.  
Staff at all levels should be well motivated to perform at the high level that a cash transfer 
requires. Government would need to upgrade the environment in which the MCDSS staff work 
including physical assets and infrastructure which were found to be in very poor state.  
There should also be given enough resources for the functions given to them. In all these,  
at the minimum, MCDSS staff should be accorded the same resources as those obtaining in  
other line ministries. 
A strength of PWAS is the cadre of volunteers operating under its decentralised structures. 
This enables the system to operate more cost effectively than it would otherwise be. However, 
PWAS is clearly very demanding and there are questions of the extent to which these 
volunteers could on operating without some incentive. They forced to sacrifice a lot of time to 
effectively carry on their duties. The opportunity cost in terms of their own livelihood activities 
must be taken into account.  
CHAPTER 6: THE COST AND FINANCING OF CASH TRANSFERS  
Chapter 6 discusses the likely costs of social cash transfer if rolled out to cover the whole 
country. This is done within the context of historical and projected funding for social 
protection by the Government Republic of Zambia. The aim is to assess the sustainability of 
funding to a national social cash transfer scheme can be funded from available GRZ resources.  
6.1  FUNDING OF SOCIAL PROTECTION, HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TRENDS 
Table 4 (page 35) does not capture the total range of programmes in social protection but is 
used to demonstrate that various agencies are playing a role in the funding of social protection 
activities in Zambia. Donors and NGOs are funding social protection activities alongside the 
GRZ. For the programmes contained in the table the total cost in 200413 was US$16.77 million. 
However, 74.5 per cent of this went to the Food Security Pack alone. In the same year GRZ 
spent K201 billion on the Fertiliser Support Programme and the Strategic Food Reserve 
equivalent to US$43 million. This demonstrates the historical bias of developing countries 
governments and donor agencies towards food subsidies compared to other forms of social 
safety nets.  
Table 5 (page 36) and the observations made on it make the point that “social protection 
interventions in Zambia are piecemeal, fragmented, and reactive, with a proliferation of 
programmes focused on target groups and an emphasis of in-kind forms of support”  
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TABLE 4 
Indicative Cost of Social Protection Programmes, 2004 
Agency Responsible  Programme  Funding Agency  Number of HHs 
Cost  
(US$ m) 
MCDSS - PAM  Food Security Pack  GRZ  150,000  12.50 
MCDSS - PWAS  Public Welfare Assistance 
Scheme 
GRZ, GTZ, UNICEF, 
DANIDA 
134,092 1.1 
MCDSS - GTZ  Kalomo Social Cash Transfer 
Scheme 
GTZ 1,000 0.04 
MCDSS MicroBankers  Trust    3,619  0.23 
  School Feeding Programme      0.4 
Habitat for Humanity 
Zambia 
Habitat for Humanity Zambia  NGO    0.4 
Zambia Red Cross- 
Street Kids  
Street Children Project of 
Zambia 
GRZ, Donors  48 children  0.2 
SCOPE OVC  SCOPE OVC  USAID  523,166 
children 
0.8 
CRAIDS    World Bank  63 Community 
Grants 
0.7 
Micro-Bankers Trust  Micro-Bankers Trust  GRZ  3,619  0.4 
Source: Refer to footnote 13. 
 
Social welfare is only a small proportion of total Government expenditure. Between 1994 
and 2006, GRZ expenditure on social welfare were mostly less than 1 per cent (see Figure 4).  
In some years government has budgeted significant funds that could have helped PWAS 
operations become meaningful. But releases have consistently been much lower than the 
budgeted amounts, as low as 10 to 12 per cent in some years.  It has also been erratic in the 
sense that the DSW could go on for months without any PWAS funding and then suddenly a 
relatively huge amount is disbursed at one go. This overwhelms the capacities of PWAS 
structures, especially where they begin to fall into disuse due to lack of operational funds. 
The low releases by the GRZ to social protection are a source of concern. However, there is 
hope that this situation may change. According to the Green Paper released in November 
2007, social protection as a per centage of total expenditure was expected to rise to 2.87 and 
3.84 per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively before falling to 1.64 per cent in 2010 (see Table 5). 
In Kwacha terms, social protection was expected to would reach K489.76 billion in 2008 before 
falling to K245.47 billion in 2010. Figures of actual expenditure for 2007 were not yet available 
when this study was conducted. However, there are indications that releases considerably 
improved although this may still fall below the budgeted amount.  
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FIGURE 4 
Social Welfare Expenditure as a Per Centage of Total GRZ Expenditure   
 
Source: CSO, Unpublished Data. 
TABLE 5 
Projected GRZ Expenditure by Function, 2007 – 2010 (%)  
Function  2007 2008 2009 2010 
General Public Services  33.11 32.51 31.22 27.92 
Defence  6.63 6.42 6.47 6.56 
Public Order and Safety  3.83  4.24  4.34  4.34 
Economic  Affairs  19.33 18.58 19.98 23.33 
Environment Protection  0.86 0.83 0.84 0.85 
Housing and Community Amenities  6.72 6.48 6.52 6.56 
Health  10.75 11.45 11.57 11.93 
Recreation, Culture and Religion  0.89 1.12 1.76 1.56 
Education 15.03  14.56 14.96 15.30 
Social  Protection  2.85 3.82 2.34 1.64 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Source: GRZ, November 2007, Table 4.    
6.2  CSTS COSTS AND STRUCTURES  
To assess what the observations of the low funding to social protection of the GRZ  
budget entail for the uptake of social cash transfers, it is necessary to assess the cost of 
implementing a scheme nationwide. As stated, the difficulty with the exercise is that a  
model scheme is yet to be adopted. Different pilot schemes implemented with different 
transfer amounts making the total cost vary widely. Therefore, an accurate estimate of the 
total cost of the scheme will only be possible once the SP-SAG adopts what should be  
the scheme to be rolled out throughout the country. At the same time, all the schemes  
have been scaling up slowly and only the Kalomo scheme had finally covered the entire 
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picture of the cost implications of running a national social cash transfer scheme.  
An additional difficulty is that it is not known what will be the pattern of rollout. 
Cash transfer costs of the Kalomo schemes are divided into three main parts: transfer, 
administration and capital costs. In the case of the first two, detailed information is available 
from accounting records and detailed in Form 16, which is the document that the DSWO uses 
to request for funding.  
Table 6 below gives the cost of the SCTS for Kalomo based on which national estimates 
are made. The key has been to determine the cost per beneficiary household of administrative 
and transfer costs. The capital costs in the Kalomo scheme are taken as representing the 
average capital cost per district as this is not related to the number of beneficiaries but  
on the mere fact that the scheme is rolled to the district.  
The cost for Kalomo covering 3,300 households is estimated at K2.3 billion (US$590,000). 
Based on the projected population for 2009, it is expected that there would be a total of 
2,483,372 in Zambia in that year.14 Targeting 10 per cent of households as beneficiaries of the 
scheme, this yields a total of 248,337 households for a national scheme in 2009. The projected 
cost based on this is K193.4billion, equivalent to US$48.3 million.  
TABLE 6 
Estimated Costs for Kalomo and Zambia for 2009 
Cost Items  Kalomo SCTS Cost/HH  National  SCTS 
In Zambian Kwacha (ZMK’000) 
Targeting 206,000 62.42   15,501,195.54 
Monitoring  8,100 2.45       608,425.65 
Payment  78,000 23.64     5,870,686.68 
Additional staff costs  30,000 9.09     2,257,383.33 
Transport  14,640 4.44     1,102,616.28 
Office expenses  7,500 2.27       563,724.99 
Total administrative costs  344,240 104.32   25,906,515.84 
Transfer of ZMK 47,500/hh  1,881,000 570.00 141,552,090.00 
Capital costs  81,000 81,000.00 5,832,000.00
Total costs  2,569,480 778.63 193,362,638.31 
Number of households  3,300 248,337
In United States Dollars  
Targeting            51,500  15.61         3,875,299 
Monitoring              2,025  0.61            152,106 
Payment            19,500  5.91         1,467,672 
Additional staff costs              7,500  2.27            564,346 
Transport              3,660  1.11            275,654 
Office expenses              1,875  0.57            140,931 
Total administrative costs            86,060  26.08         6,476,629 
Transfer of ZMK 47,500/hh          470,250  142.50       35,388,023 
Capital costs            20,250         20,250.00          1,458,000 
Total costs        642,370  194.66      48,340,660 
Number of households  3,300 248,33738       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
Table 7 indicates the projected cost based on the assumption that the cash transfer 
system is to be rolled out to all the districts in one year, i.e. 2009, all at once. The cost according 
to the envisaged rollout speed given in the Implementation Framework document is shown in 
Table 9 for each year between 2009 and 2012. The cost rises from K37 billion (US$9.2 million) in 
2009 to K177.6 billion (US$44.4 million) in 2012. In cumulative terms, this amounts to K412 
billion (US$103 million) for the four years of rollout. Whether this is fiscally realistic in the light 
of the historical pattern of funding to social protection is addressed below.  
TABLE 7 
Estimated Costs for Each Year of Rollout 
Cost Item 
Cost/HH 2009  2010  2011  2012 








In Zambian Kwacha (ZMK’000) 
Targeting   62.42       3,229,424     3,229,424       4,305,919         4,736,492 
Monitoring  2.45         126,756        253,511          422,520           608,428 
Payment  23.64       1,223,063     2,446,125       4,076,883         5,870,710 
Additional staff costs  9.09         470,289        940,579       1,567,634         2,257,392 
Transport  4.44         229,712        459,425          765,709         1,102,621 
Office expenses  2.27         117,443        234,886          391,477           563,727 
Total administrative costs  104.32       5,397,204   10,794,408     17,990,714       25,906,620 
Transfer of K47,500/hh  570     29,490,090   58,980,180     98,300,490     141,552,660 
Capital costs   135,000.00       2,025,000     4,050,000       6,750,000         9,720,000 
Total costs  715.22  37,003,337  74,006,674 123,344,696   177,616,304 
Number of HHs     51,737 103,474 172,456  248,337
HHs added in the year        51,737  68,983  75,881 
In United States Dollars  
Targeting  15.61  807,356        807,356       1,076,480         1,184,123 
Monitoring  0.61           31,689          63,378          105,630           152,107 
Payment  5.91         305,766        611,531       1,019,221         1,467,678 
Additional staff costs  2.27         117,572        235,145          391,909           564,348 
Transport  1.11           57,428        114,856          191,427           275,655 
Office expenses  0.57           29,361          58,721            97,869           140,932 
Total administrative costs  26.08       1,349,301     2,698,602       4,497,679         6,476,655 
Transfer of K47,500/hh  142.50       7,372,523   14,745,045     24,575,123       35,388,165 
Capital costs   20,250.00         506,250     1,012,500       1,687,500         2,430,000 
Total costs  194.66  9,250,834 18,501,669    30,836,174     44,404,076 
Number of HHs     51,737 103,474 172,456  248,337
HHs added in the year       51,737 68,983  75,881
 
The structure of costs based on the Kalomo SCTS is presented in Table 8. The scheme has 
a very high transfer ratio of 0.732 compared to capital costs of 0.032 and administrative costs                Country Study  39 
 
of 0.134. Nearly 75 per cent of the total cost is on transfers to beneficiaries indicating a very 
high transfer ratio. Even though the cost equivalent of the cadre of volunteers has not been 
worked, this is indicative of the cost efficiency of the social cash transfer scheme.  
TABLE 8 










Targeting 51,500  15.61 0.110  0.080 
Monitoring 2,025  0.61  0.004  0.003 
Payment 19,500  5.91  0.041  0.030 
Additional staff costs  7,500 2.27  0.016  0.012 
Transport 3,660  1.11  0.008  0.006 
Office expenses  1,875 0.57  0.004  0.003 
Total administrative costs  86,060 26.08  0.183  0.134 
Transfer of ZMK 47,500/hh  470,250 142.5  1.000  0.732 
Capital costs  20,250 20,250.00  0.043  0.032 
Total costs  642,370 194.66       
6.3  AFFORDABILITY AND FINANCING RISK 
In the light of the analysis above, the question to be answered is, can a national SCTS be 
financed from the GRZ budget? Looking at the historical under-funding of social protection 
alone, the projected costs of a full scale SCTS cannot be met without the help of donors. The 
concern here is that a full scale SCTS will only last as long as donor funding is available as has 
been the case to other schemes experimented upon since the launch of the redesigned PWAS. 
But discontinuing a programme of national scale just after a short time will present problems 
for the MCDSS and GRZ as a whole.15 
The latest 2008 – 2010 Medium Term Expenditure Framework released in November 2007 
presents some hope but does not discount all the concerns observed above. For 2009, the cost 
of social cash transfer scheme rolled out in 15 districts would be 11.4 per cent of the social 
protection budget. It jumps to 29 per cent in 2010 when the number of districts increases to 
30. What is of concern here is the projected decline in the social protection budget between 
2008 and 2010.  
Such a proportion may be untenable unless MCDSS conducts a large scale restructuring of 
its own budget to accommodate a national SCTS. There are opportunities for this given that 
regularly disbursed social cash transfer would resolve so many critical welfare problems among 
the highly disadvantaged people that the MCDSS grapples with. But it is admitted that such a 
proportion is still too high without the Ministry of Finance increasing the budget for social 
protection. This may require Finance to undertake a restructuring of the budget itself. For 
example, substantially reducing the amounts GRZ spends on maize subsidies through the 
Fertiliser Support Programme and funding the Food Reserve Agency would help to release 
some funds for social protection and other expenditures. 40       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE 9 
Projected Social Protection Budget, 2007 – 2010 (ZMK’ billion) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Disability  9.93 10.23 11.22 12.24 
Old  age  0.25 0.26 0.28 0.31 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children  14.81 20.11 21.08 22.10 
Social  Security  Welfare  31.78 1.84 2.01 2.20 
Rehabilitation and Dev Social Protection  4.93 5.09 5.57 6.08 
National  Disaster  8.57 8.83 9.68  10.56 
Other Social Protection  273.27 443.40 274.51 191.98 
Total Social Protection Budget  343.54 489.76 324.35 245.47 
Projected Rollout SCT Cost  -  -  36.90  71.2 
As Per centage of Social Protection Budget  -  -  11.38  29.01 
Source: GRZ, November 2007, Table 5.    
 
Besides restructuring of the budget, GRZ is expecting to raise substantial revenues from 
the windfall tax imposed on mineral exports announced in the 2008 budget. It is projected 
that GRZ would raise an additional US$450 million from this windfall tax. With this, it is 
fiscally feasible that funding to social protection could be at least maintained at the same 
level as the 2008 budget of K489.8 billion. If this is done, when the SCTS reaches its full scale 
in 2012 it will constitute 34.8 per cent of the total social protection budget. Such a high 
proportion would still require that a restructuring of the social protection budget to 
accommodate social cash transfers.  
A major risk is the tendency of the Ministry of Finance to cut back on releases once the 
budget has been announced. Figure 4 also provides some insight into how releases can vary 
from one year to another. One of the reasons for this is the tendency to over-spend on some 
budget items by Ministry of Finance at the expense of other expenditure lines. Usually the 
budget lines that in the end get “over-funded” are those with strong political support. For 
example, the Fertiliser Support Programme was increased by 38.1 per cent of its budgeted 
amount in 2004.  
In 2006, the Strategic Food Reserve (money spent for the purchase of maize) received an 
additional K140 billion in 2006 when its budget was only K50 billion. This was an increase of 
about 140 per cent over the budgeted amount. Funding for personnel emoluments in many 
years also exceed the budgeted amount. All this occurs at the expense of the less politically 
protected expenditures of which social protection is one. Therefore, until social protection 
gains the backing of the more politically influential players in the country, it will always be 
difficult to predict that what GRZ puts in the MTEF (Medium Term Expenditure Framework)  
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY OF KEY CAPACITY ISSUES  
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
Below we outline the key actions that should be undertaken before rollout in the light of this 
review. Given that social cash transfers have not had wide acceptance and support among 
political elite, it needs to be effective from the very start and create groundswell support and 
momentum of its own so that it is not undermined by undue criticism. Recommended actions 
are grouped into the three main category of capacity assessment used in this report – 
institutional, organisational and human resource. 
7.2  ACTIONS TO IMPROVE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
Most of the institutional difficulties that MCDSS faces cut across the entire public service and 
are outside its ability to improve. However, the MCDSS could lend a hand to the ongoing 
public sector reforms including decentralisation and financial management and accountability. 
Decentralisation is likely to strengthen the coordination of social protection activities at district 
and sub-district levels. Financial management and accountability reforms through PEMFAR 
and IFMIS planned for all levels of government will help to strengthen the financial 
management inadequacies noted within the MCDSS. There is concern that these critical 
reforms have been slow but there is little that the MCDSS can do.  
However, within the institutional framework for social protection, the MCDSS should take 
steps to increase its capacity to lobby and secure political buy-in of key stakeholders into its 
social protection agenda in general and that of social cash transfers in particular. In this regard, 
MCDSS should fully implement its agenda for promoting social protection. Commendable 
effort has been made since the first part of 2007 but should now be scaled up as the planned 
date for starting rollout approaches. As part of this, the MCDSS should engage the MoFNP to 
prove the economic merits of social protection and why these are not handouts but an 
investment in human capital. A well researched case needs to be prepared and sold to MoFNP 
and the general public especially with the beginning of such an ambitious programme as the 
national SCTS. 
Overall, the MCDSS should take advantage of the current structures to communicate 
through existing channels to players with a key role in social protection. In this regard, a 
communication strategy should be developed which identifies the key players, their 
information needs on social protection and an appropriate means to reach them. 
7.3  ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY 
The key issue leading to organisational capacity weaknesses have to do with chronic under-
funding to the MCDSS and social protection activities. Whereas a national SCTS could be rolled 
out and funded with the help donors, it is prudent that the Zambian Government has fiscal 
capacity and is committed to fund this beyond the years of donor support. Actions to lobby for 
social protection in general in the understanding of the general public and key players as have 
been initiated are very important. Engaging MoFNP as recommended above will help secure 
adequate flow of resources and sustainability of a national SCTS. 42       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
On the basis of the current MTEF projections and the likely increased revenue arising from 
the new windfall taxes on mining, fiscal sustainability does not seem to be a major issue. What 
seems to be an issue is MoFNP failing to release budgeted funds because these are diverted to 
other budget lines with more political protection. The Ministry of Finance should therefore 
seek to increase expenditure to social protection or at the minimum maintain the 2008 social 
protection budget in subsequent years. 
Even with this action by the MoFNP, the MCDSS should conduct an expenditure review to 
determine the fiscal sustainability of social protection activities in the light of the proposed 
national SCTS. It should also determine what should be the structure of expenditure in social 
protection. This would entail looking at the current activities being implemented by the DSW 
and whether the introduction of a SCTS would in fact take care of some of the issues currently 
being tackled and how therefore some of these could be weaned off from ongoing budget 
lines for social protection to make way for social cash transfer. 
Before rolling out a social cash transfer scheme to each district, there should be adequate 
physical assets and infrastructure to sustain it. This means among other things that the district 
should have adequate office accommodation to cater for an increase in staff, furniture and 
fittings, computers, communication facilities and transport. Apart from office accommodation, 
the amount required to bring to basic level physical assets in districts amount to about 7 per 
cent of the estimated cost of a national SCTS. What is key is for the MCDSS to come up with a 
physical assets and infrastructure investment plan. 
The MCDSS should also take action to review and improve the M&E system and build the 
necessary capacity at all levels. Actions to improve the adequacy of physical assets including 
transport and computers will go a long way in strengthening the M&E system. Training in M&E 
for key officers is also needed.  
7.4  ACTIONS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The human resource constraints that the MCDSS faces arise mainly from the weak space it 
occupies in the institutional architecture and its organisational weaknesses. Proposed actions 
above will thus go a long way in resolving human resource constraints as well. For example, 
with improved flow of funds and adequacy of resources, the motivation of MCDSS staff is likely 
to increase remarkably. However, specific human resource related actions are needed to 
augment the actions proposed for institutional and organisational capacity. 
The first is the need to complete the recruitment programme for all districts to ensure that 
all vacancies are occupied by staff with the necessary qualifications. The second is adopting a 
human resource development plan that continuously upgrades the skills of MCDSS staff and 
partner organisations in social protection management. Although long-term training should 
have a role, emphasis should placed on a tailor-made training programme that exposes a large 
number of MCDSS staff and personnel from partner organisations on pertinent issues 
regarding the management of social protection programmes.  
Thirdly, an incentive system for the PWAS cadre of volunteers should be found. There 
should be enough resources to reimburse them the costs they incur in undertaking their 
functions. They will also be motivated if they are given adequate equipment and materials                 Country Study  43 
 
for their work including transportation, stationery and protective clothing. A programme of 
continuous training would also help to lift their motivation. Recognition for their work through 
some reward from time to time should be integrated in the incentive system for volunteers. 
The targeting, approval and payment process of a social cash transfer scheme brings 
about capacity demands that should be looked into before rollout begins. Two are critically 
important. First is the need to adopt a much simpler means testing criteria to match the level 
of literacy and skills available at community level. A universal social protection scheme such as 
being piloted in the Katete SCTS offers some merit in this regard. The second is the need to 
upgrade the skills of the ACC members so that they can provide intensive and quality 
supervision and monitoring to CWACs. 44       International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
ACRONYMS 
ACC Area  Coordinating Committee
ACDO Assistant  Community Development Officer
ADC  Area Development Committee
AIDS Acquired  Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
CWAC Community Welfare Assistance Committee
DDCC  District Development Coordinating Committee
DFID  Department for International Development
DSW  Department of Social Welfare
DSWO  District Social Welfare Office
DWAC  District Welfare Assistance Committee
FGD Focus  Group  Discussion
FNDP  Fifth National Development Plan
FSP  Fertiliser Support Programme
FSPs Food  Security Packs
GRZ  Government of the Republic of Zambia
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MCDSS Ministry of Community Development and Social Services 
MTEF 
MIS 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
Management Information System
MoFNP Ministry of Finance and National Planning
NDCC  National Development Coordinating Committee
OVC  Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PACU  Provincial Accounting Control Unit
PAM  Programme Against Malnutrition
PDCC  Provincial Development Coordinating Committee
PEMD  Planning and Economic Management Division
PPM Pay Point Manager
PSC  Public Service Commission
PSWO  Provincial Social Welfare Office
PWAS  Public Welfare Assistance Scheme
SCTS  Social Cash Transfer Scheme
SPS  Social Protection Strategy
SP-SAG  Social Protection Sector Advisory Group
TWG  Technical Working Group on Social Assistance
VDC  Village Development Committee               Country Study  45 
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1. There have been reviews looking at adequate staffing levels and a proposal was made to Cabinet. Unfortunately 
effecting changes in staffing levels takes a long time (initial proposal was rejected but dialogue continues). In the 
meantime, additional posts in pilot schemes are currently paid by donors. 
2. According to the document, the plan was to have 15 districts covered in 2009, 30 in 2010, 50 in 2011 and 
72 in 2012.  
3. Trainers indicated the level of oversight during the training was insufficient, thereby limiting the amount of 
support and guidance given during the identification, interviewing and beneficiary verification process.    
4. There are still nine districts countrywide not operating the redesigned PWAS – Chilubi, Kitwe, Lusaka, Milenge, 
Mpongwe, Mpulungu, Mungwi, Namwala and Ndola. 
5. Katete Social Cash Transfer Scheme, Report on the verification of newly registered beneficiaries, March 2008. 
6. This was not based on any objective assessment of the extent of inclusion error but was an impromptu 
response of the respondents when asked to estimate how much this would be from their observations.  
Even if the figures are incorrect, they should be taken to point to the scale of the problem, at least as 
perceived by a number of people in the scheme. 
7. In one case, Kasempa, the DSWO had a computer but could not utilise it because the office has had no power  
for some months. 
8. Some people suggest that this is because there is no equivalent body to the DDCC at national level.  
There is supposed to be an NDCC headed by the Secretary to the Cabinet but this has in reality not worked. 
9. It was supposed to be finished by 2010 according to the Decentralisation Implementation Plan. 
10. In some areas, CWACs and Neighborhood Committees have exactly the same people and only change names 
depending on which activity they are considering at the time.  
11. Eastern Province held a workshop for staff from all the districts to train them in how to use the filing index.  
This was said to have improved tremendously the management of information generated on various activities. 
12. The substantive position is social welfare officer.  
13. This is the year when data on the annual cost was available for a reasonable number of social protection 
programmes due to RuralNet Associates Limited’s “Assessment Study in the Framework of the Development of a 
Social Protection Strategy” completed in February 2005. Information has been supplemented from other sources 
including Economic Reports and the Drivers of Change in Social Protection study (November 2005).   
14. The projected population for 2009 is 12,902,108. It is assumed that household average size in 2009 would 
remain the same as in 2000 when the national census was conducted at 5.2 members per household. Dividing this 
into the projected population, we arrive at the projected number of households. It is admitted that keeping 
household size constant is a heroic assumption as changes would be expected after a period of ten years. However, 
it is difficult to know the direction of household size as there are so many dynamics determining this. It has been 
kept constant for this reason.    
15. Some would argue that the potential predicament this poses is more reason to still go ahead with rolling out as 
GRZ is unlikely to discontinue a national programme with clear acceptance and benefits on the ground because 
this would be politically untenable.  International
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